On 10 Mar 2015, at 17:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/10/2015 1:17 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
My view is that modern science mostly gives us no reason to prefer
materialism or non-materialism. Bruno's Universal Dovetailer
Argument convinced me that there are empirical reasons to prefer
non-materialism, given that I find computationalism highly
plausible, and his argument shows that computationalism and
materialism are incompatible. I know you don't accept the argument,
but I haven't found any flaw in it (which doesn't mean it doesn't
exist).
So what exactly is the incompatibility? Bruno takes computation to
be fundamental,
I assume that the brain, or generalized "brain(*)", to be Turing
emulable.
(*) whatever the "real" object you need to be conscious, as far as it
is Turing emulable)
There are evidence coming from Darwin, Mendel, Watson, Monod, etc
(biology), and there are no evidence for the contrary, with the
notable exception of the "collapse of the wave", if that exists.
but he agrees that it must produce physics as well as
consciousness. I think he agrees that the physics is necessary for
the existence of consciousness - at least human-like consciousness.
OK. But physics must conform to the computationalist constraints,
which indeed, should constraints it completely: all the rest is
geography and history. With computationalism, physics is redefined
into what a universal machine can predict about its future first
person experience. The case of "certainty" is handled by the logic of
[]p & <>p, for reason related to the UDA: you are prety sure you will
drink coffee if you manage to "drink coffee" in all (or almost all)
consistent extensions, be it in Washington, or in Moscow.
And he often makes the point that physics assumes matter BUT it
doesn't need to assume matter is fundamental,
Yes. Most physicists don't mind about the nature of the ontology.
or even define matter. In fact physics redefines matter as it
develops theories.
Yes.
With comp, it is just that the theory of mind matters. It should be
expected given the depart between "is" and "observable".
The only thing I see as the essence of "matter" is that it's
something we can agree on via ostensive definitions.
Possible. The ostensive might be related, or translated with the "&
<>t", as ostension gives the third person triangle (the kids point to
a thing so that his mother saw the thing).
Animals (notably the bonobos) don't get them apparently, in that sense
they are not Löbian.
It's not personal, as consciousness seems to be.
OK.
So it may not be able to explain consciousness. But it's not really
incompatibility for one to theory that take computation to be
fundamental and another theory to take something else as fundamental.
Yes, but all theory, physics, biology, astronomy, takes the natural
number seriously.
Computationalism leads to a problem: for being able to work: all other
science must be retrieved from machine self-reference.
And the math confirms and the theory was well intuited by Plotinus and
the school of rationalist and mystic.
Until it will be refuted. I mean its classical version
Incompatibility would mean they predict contrary things, not that
they make different assumptions in reaching the prediction.
Absolutely. Computationalism only make the Aristotelian notion of
primary matter into a gap-of-the-God type of explanation.
The compatibility issue is really a question of studying things more
closely. The case of classical computationalism relies in the
comparison between the Z1* logic, and the math of QM.
The problem for some is religious, though and they believe physics is
the fundamental science, and concerns a physical reality independent
of us the humans.
But fundamental physics will evolve in a way that this remains true,
but with "us" the Löbian numbers, instead of us the human.
The physicalness is what can glue dreams in coherent sharable
realities, in a complex web of arithmetical dream.
We don't need to assume more than Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz). It is a
mathematical theory, but as a TOE it is testable once you define in it
the observer (which is the same + enough induction axioms, represented
here by a combinator).
Physics converges to that from observation and reflection, with
Galilee, Einstein, Everett (and others).
Computationalism starts from universal numbers and should converge to
physics. But with the ability to explain the difference between quanta
and qualia.
Bruno
Brent
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