On 12 Mar 2015, at 20:16, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> I have two theory of intelligence:
That's one too many.
I think they imply themselves. The second is a particular case of the
first.
It is an antic theory, not so far from Krishnamurti and Bohm in their
book on intelligence.
And it is at the least an example of a theory of intelligence and
stupidity which admits a clear axiiomatization, and different
semantic: as it satisfies the theories stating that we die at each
instant, with dying = accessing a cul-de-sac world, and living =
having at least one accessible world/
It is the normal modal logical theory K + <>p -> ~[]<>p, or
equivalently: <>t -> ~[]<>t. (that is the modal translation of Gödel's
second incompleteness theorem.
If either intelligence theory was more than hot air you'd be a
trillionaire. Are you a trillionaire?
Oh ! I have an idea: study it by yourself, and make a better
advertizing than the current one. Thank you.
Also, it is a sub-theory of G.
Exercise: derive from G's main axiom []([]p -> p)-> []p, that <>t ->
~[]<>t
And G is not my theory. It is the theory of all correct classical
universal machine believing in enough induction axioms, to paraphrase
Solovay first theorem.
And guess what? Solovay discovered G*, which axiomatizes the true
sentences about the machine (by definition at or below its
substitution level), so we get a good view on the initial segment of
what is true but not provable, and the machine can too.
This is how your reason John: if step 3 is not invalid, the guy
deserves the Nobel Prize. But he did not, he would at least be
millionaire or something), so I guess step 3 is not valid.
Well, we are still trying to understand what makes you stop at step 3.
We have agreed that with the third person use of the pronoun, you
arrive in both city. And we have agreed that for the first person
pronoun after duplication, a selection has been made among {W, M}. By
definition of the FPI, it is talk of the average member of those
having undergone self-duplication in their past. And this, a simple
combinatorial analysis shows to be *very* random, indeed
algorithmically incompressible.
Anyway. My point is in explaining a problem. Physicallists assume that
there is a physical universe. The problem is that the universal
machine cannot distinguish a physical universe from a universal
number, or from a universal number + an oracle.
Are you familiar with the fact that universal machine and
computations, once we accept the Church-Turing Thesis, are concept
definable in elementary arithmetic?
Using a physical reality to maintain universal machine personal
experience is the same explanatory mistake than using God to explain
the existence of the physical universe. You endow to machines a non
Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable ability.
Move on step 4. Keep in mind we look only to the diaries/memories of
the duplicates. Normally you should say: even my little niece can
conceive that, by introducing delays of reconstitution, we can't
change directly the first person experience (directly = without
external clues). OK. Good, what about step 5?
You have agreed once that consciousness cannot be localized, yet you
seem to want to localize it in a physical universe, but with comp, it
is localized in infinity of computations in elementary arithmetic. How
does the physical universe win the competition below your
substitution level?
I just try to help you understanding a problem.
Bruno
John K Clark
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