On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 7:04 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 16 Mar 2015, at 08:21, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 4:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 13 Mar 2015, at 17:57, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 13 Mar 2015, at 08:19, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 1:25 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 3/12/2015 1:21 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Not me. I'm the opposite, I was always confused by the idea that >>>> rocks are not conscious. >>>> >>>> >>>> If you ever have an operation, I suggest you check to see that your >>>> anesthesiologist is not confused. >>>> >>> >>> There's maybe a difference between being a conscious entity and being >>> conscious of something. >>> >>> >>> >>> Does not consciousness entails the consciousness of at least one thing? >>> >>> Even before speculating about an entity (the future "little ego") >>> consciousness seems reflexive to me, before verbalizing. >>> >>> It is the fixed point of the doubt. If we try to doubt everything, we >>> find the indubitable but non justifiable knowledge of one thing. >>> >> >> My intuitive impression (from some attempts at meditating, for example) >> is that consciousness can exist in a completely self-referential state. But >> I am not certain of this at all. I think this is inline with what you say >> above, and with "cogito ergo sum". >> >> >> That might be. Thomas Slezak, and myself, like to interpret Descartes in >> arithmetic, so that a doubt of p, is defined by <>~p, and thus ~[]p, and >> the fixed point is the famous Gödel sentence g, which is such that PA >> proves (rationally believes) g <> ~[]g, which should be then, as far as PA >> trust herself and her correctness, true and non believable/justifiable. >> But to get the knowledge itself, which results from that, you need the >> knower variant= [1]p = []p & p. That one has [1]p -> p, and just can't >> doubt everything: he is the one living the fixed point of the doubt. >> > > What does [1]p mean? Is it a reference to first person? > > > [1]p is defined by []p & p. It is the modal connector you get when you > apply Theaetetus idea to Gödel beweisbar predicate, which describes the > 3p-self of the machine, its "body" representation, with possible higher > level features, like I have legs, or I am in Helsinki". > Ah, ok! > > The logic of [1] is the one axiomatized by the logic S4Grz, and S4Grz1 > (when p is limited to the sigma_1 proposition, which translate the UD in > arithmetic. > > We know (or strongly believe) that PA is correct, and Gödel-Löbian, so we > know that for all p, []p <-> [1]p. And indeed: G* proves []p <-> ([]p & p), > that is []p <-> []p & p. But PA does not know that, nor can she believe > that. G does not prove, for all p, that []p <-> ([]p & p). There is no > knowledge ([1]), nor belief ([]p) that I am that machine []p. Only God > knows your substitution level, where []p & []p & p equate. > > > > > >> I think that meditation tries to diminish the dominance of the []p, and >> meditation favor the "p", in the []p & p part of the knower. >> > > I still don't fully grasp the []p & p thing. My naive interpretation would > be that meditation favours []p, given that it sometimes generates a feeling > of identification with the totality of things. > > > You are right. Meditation leads you on the totality, that is the truth. We > can say "p is true" in arithmetic, so we say "p" instead, which means "p is > true", when asserted as p by the machine. > Ok. > > On the contrary, []p is "beweisbar p", it represents a description of the > machinery in the language understandable by the machinery. It is > representational. It is, or might be the same truth of the same p, but seen > through to window of some 3-self/body/code/number/finite-thing. > Ok. I was still a bit stuck with the "it is necessary that" interpretation of []. If I switch to "it is provable that" it starts to make more sense. I know you insisted on this several times, but it's not exactly something easy to grasp. > > p is associated with the truth, which might be more than what we, earthly > finite creature, can rationally believe ([]p). > Ok, this makes sense with mediation and other experiences. > > It is the p in []p & p, which makes "machine's knowledge" not definable in > term of number and machine. S4Grz formalizable at a level, what the machine > cannot formalize about herself (but can bet on, ...). > > Thanks to incompleteness, the Theaetetus' definition makes sense, and > distinguish the knower from the rational believer for the machine. > > Don't hesitate to ask precision. I am very literal here: the knower is > defined by the true believer. It is a modest definition of knowledge, and > it is not similar with "I know for sure that", which needs some amount of > consistency (like <>t, or <><>t, or <><><> t, etc.). > What's the difference between <>t and <><>t and so on? > > [0]p = []p, and obeys to G, and fully described by G* (at the > propositional level). > [1]p = []p & p, and obeys to S4Grz, > [2]p = []p & <>t obeys and define the logic Z > [3]p = []p & <>t & p > I definitely don't understand [2]p and [3]p. > > Mathematically, you interpret the "p" by arithmetical proposition, []p by > beweisbar("p"), an arithmetical predicate "provable(x)", with x the > proposition represented in the things the machine understand (here the > numbers, that is, the "Gödel numbers" of the sentence expressing the > proposition. > > The book by Smullyan "Forever Undecided" introduces the logic G. > It's on my "to read" list :) > > Note that G* is representable in G. I don't insist because people tend to > do repetitively the Searle, error, and believes that the G understand and > believe in what G* says about him/her (G; not G*), but one day I should > explain the representation theorem of G* in G, because it mirrors someway > the machines mind before a self-multiplication, trying to justify the jump, > without success, except by betting (still) on finite parts of itself. > > Bit this type of modest knowledge is not yet enough for the > knowing-for-sure, which is needed for a treatment of consciousness. It > might be <>t v t. Consciousness would be really obvious, from the 1p view > of the machine. I am not sure. > Thanks for the explanation and patience and sorry for the delay! I wanted to take some time to read this. Telmo. > > Bruno > > > > >> It leads to the problem that consciousness becomes a feature of the >> arithmetical truth, only restricted by the little ego, owner of the body >> and representations. We might need that God (Truth) is a knower itself, and >> thus a sort of person, because only God would be conscious. >> > > The word "God" still makes me cringe, but this is mostly because of > organized religion. I plan on reading Plotinus soon and see if I change my > mind. But I think I understand and agree with what you're saying, otherwise. > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> I think. >>> >>> You might say it is not a consciousness *of* something. I might have >>> missed a nuance. >>> >> >> I will clarify what I meant in a reply to Brent, to keep the discussion >> linear. >> >> >> Oops, sorry for bringing some non linearity, but that's because the black >> hole in my basement is active again ... >> The nice thing is that I just need to read your post to Brent to get the >> clarification, and see if it matches the universal machine's explanation. >> >> Bruno >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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