On 13 Mar 2015, at 19:21, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/13/2015 10:06 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 5:44 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/13/2015 12:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 1:25 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/12/2015 1:21 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Not me. I'm the opposite, I was always confused by the idea that rocks are not conscious.

If you ever have an operation, I suggest you check to see that your anesthesiologist is not confused.

There's maybe a difference between being a conscious entity and being conscious of something.

Telmo.

So you think you could be conscious without being conscious *of* something?

I'm not sure, as per my response to Bruno. But this is not what I meant to suggest here. My argument is simply that anaesthetics appear to allow one to not be conscious of the external environment. We can only speculate if one remains conscious of some internal environment.

That's just mystification. We don't "only speculate". We can monitor brain waves, hormone levels, blood pressure, reflexes.


I say "appear to allow", because in fact there is only two thing we know for sure about this:

1) one is not capable of controlling one's muscles
2) one is not capable of forming memories

There seems to be a lack of consistency on this list as to what or who "one" or "you" refers to.

I disagree. On this list some of us are more precise on this than anywhere else.

In the math part, all "you" are defined mathematically, and all the relations between the yous are too.

In the UDA, you need nothing more than what you need to say yes or no to a doctor. It is bad philosophy to introduce non relevant complications. The diary distinction between the 1-you and the 3-ypu are tyipical 3p simple notion, so that kids can verify the proposition.




On the one hand it's asserted that "one" is just a sequence of "observer moments" or a bundle of such sequences. And there is always a "next moment" which is determined just by which of the many observer moments is most consistent with the indicial one.

No, the one brought by a computation in arithmetic. The problem is that there is an infinity of computations which brings the state, but the measure is on the computations, not the states. It is not a proble in arithmetic, because the sigma_1 true sentences verify p <->[]p, so the computations are themselves described by sigma_1 true arithmetical sentences.




No one dies because there is, in everythingism, always *some* next moment. But in that model there's no reason there should not be gaps, i.e. places where the next moment, even the most consistent next moment, has discontinuities - i.e. you weren't just unconscious, you didn't exist (relative to other more continuous sequences).

If this is an attempt to refute computationalism, you need to compute the relative measure of that state, and this by choosing some substitution level.





We assume and hope that:

3) one is not capable of perceiving the environment, namely the pain from the surgery

Suppose there were such observer moments in which pain was experienced. If you formed no memories, in what sense was it YOUR pain? This seems to invoke a magic spirit that links the observer moments - exactly the thing that was supposed to be explained away.


But unfortunately we cannot be sure about 3). Some horror movie scenarios can be true.

We can assume that there is a correspondence between consciousness and intelligent action, but we re already on shaky grounds because of dreaming, as you mention. With dreaming 1) holds but not 2). If states exist where both 1) and 2) holds, we have no means to know about them for sure.

That we don't know something for sure, doesn't entail that we don't know it.

Yes. That's the base of the idea of Theaetetus; knowledge is just when our rational beliefs are true.





This leads me to my doubt about rocks beings conscious, that I had since I was a little kid.

I think that's wrong and that's why I think consciousness requires physics - dreams not withstanding.

Or physics requires consciousness.

That's what Dennett calls a deepity. I've been unconscious several times in my life. Are you proposing that the physical world was affected by this? Did the world cease to exist? Or are you just referring to physics = the theory of how matter and energy work, and theories are the inventions of conscious beings?

It is more that physics, as a metaphysics, explains consciousness and matter-appearance away. He does not address the question. When honest and lucid, it admits to eliminate the person. For computationalism, the person is the main existent, with the numbers which incarnate them relatively in dreams. Then the question of the unicity or unifiability of our collective dreams remain an hard open question.

There is no problem at all with the physical science. There is only a problem when the metaphysical assumption of the existence of a physical universe is presented as a dogma, instead of an hypothesis. I mean if we want to do science.

Bruno





Brent

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