On 16 Mar 2015, at 08:21, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 4:27 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 13 Mar 2015, at 17:57, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 13 Mar 2015, at 08:19, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 1:25 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 3/12/2015 1:21 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Not me. I'm the opposite, I was always confused by the idea that
rocks are not conscious.
If you ever have an operation, I suggest you check to see that
your anesthesiologist is not confused.
There's maybe a difference between being a conscious entity and
being conscious of something.
Does not consciousness entails the consciousness of at least one
thing?
Even before speculating about an entity (the future "little ego")
consciousness seems reflexive to me, before verbalizing.
It is the fixed point of the doubt. If we try to doubt everything,
we find the indubitable but non justifiable knowledge of one thing.
My intuitive impression (from some attempts at meditating, for
example) is that consciousness can exist in a completely self-
referential state. But I am not certain of this at all. I think
this is inline with what you say above, and with "cogito ergo sum".
That might be. Thomas Slezak, and myself, like to interpret
Descartes in arithmetic, so that a doubt of p, is defined by <>~p,
and thus ~[]p, and the fixed point is the famous Gödel sentence g,
which is such that PA proves (rationally believes) g <> ~[]g, which
should be then, as far as PA trust herself and her correctness, true
and non believable/justifiable.
But to get the knowledge itself, which results from that, you need
the knower variant= [1]p = []p & p. That one has [1]p -> p, and just
can't doubt everything: he is the one living the fixed point of the
doubt.
What does [1]p mean? Is it a reference to first person?
[1]p is defined by []p & p. It is the modal connector you get when you
apply Theaetetus idea to Gödel beweisbar predicate, which describes
the 3p-self of the machine, its "body" representation, with possible
higher level features, like I have legs, or I am in Helsinki".
The logic of [1] is the one axiomatized by the logic S4Grz, and S4Grz1
(when p is limited to the sigma_1 proposition, which translate the UD
in arithmetic.
We know (or strongly believe) that PA is correct, and Gödel-Löbian, so
we know that for all p, []p <-> [1]p. And indeed: G* proves []p <->
([]p & p), that is []p <-> []p & p. But PA does not know that, nor can
she believe that. G does not prove, for all p, that []p <-> ([]p & p).
There is no knowledge ([1]), nor belief ([]p) that I am that machine
[]p. Only God knows your substitution level, where []p & []p & p equate.
I think that meditation tries to diminish the dominance of the []p,
and meditation favor the "p", in the []p & p part of the knower.
I still don't fully grasp the []p & p thing. My naive interpretation
would be that meditation favours []p, given that it sometimes
generates a feeling of identification with the totality of things.
You are right. Meditation leads you on the totality, that is the
truth. We can say "p is true" in arithmetic, so we say "p" instead,
which means "p is true", when asserted as p by the machine.
On the contrary, []p is "beweisbar p", it represents a description of
the machinery in the language understandable by the machinery. It is
representational. It is, or might be the same truth of the same p, but
seen through to window of some 3-self/body/code/number/finite-thing.
p is associated with the truth, which might be more than what we,
earthly finite creature, can rationally believe ([]p).
It is the p in []p & p, which makes "machine's knowledge" not
definable in term of number and machine. S4Grz formalizable at a
level, what the machine cannot formalize about herself (but can bet
on, ...).
Thanks to incompleteness, the Theaetetus' definition makes sense, and
distinguish the knower from the rational believer for the machine.
Don't hesitate to ask precision. I am very literal here: the knower
is defined by the true believer. It is a modest definition of
knowledge, and it is not similar with "I know for sure that", which
needs some amount of consistency (like <>t, or <><>t, or <><><> t,
etc.).
[0]p = []p, and obeys to G, and fully described by G* (at the
propositional level).
[1]p = []p & p, and obeys to S4Grz,
[2]p = []p & <>t obeys and define the logic Z
[3]p = []p & <>t & p
Mathematically, you interpret the "p" by arithmetical proposition, []p
by beweisbar("p"), an arithmetical predicate "provable(x)", with x the
proposition represented in the things the machine understand (here the
numbers, that is, the "Gödel numbers" of the sentence expressing the
proposition.
The book by Smullyan "Forever Undecided" introduces the logic G.
Note that G* is representable in G. I don't insist because people tend
to do repetitively the Searle, error, and believes that the G
understand and believe in what G* says about him/her (G; not G*), but
one day I should explain the representation theorem of G* in G,
because it mirrors someway the machines mind before a self-
multiplication, trying to justify the jump, without success, except by
betting (still) on finite parts of itself.
Bit this type of modest knowledge is not yet enough for the knowing-
for-sure, which is needed for a treatment of consciousness. It might
be <>t v t. Consciousness would be really obvious, from the 1p view of
the machine. I am not sure.
Bruno
It leads to the problem that consciousness becomes a feature of the
arithmetical truth, only restricted by the little ego, owner of the
body and representations. We might need that God (Truth) is a knower
itself, and thus a sort of person, because only God would be
conscious.
The word "God" still makes me cringe, but this is mostly because of
organized religion. I plan on reading Plotinus soon and see if I
change my mind. But I think I understand and agree with what you're
saying, otherwise.
I think.
You might say it is not a consciousness *of* something. I might
have missed a nuance.
I will clarify what I meant in a reply to Brent, to keep the
discussion linear.
Oops, sorry for bringing some non linearity, but that's because the
black hole in my basement is active again ...
The nice thing is that I just need to read your post to Brent to get
the clarification, and see if it matches the universal machine's
explanation.
Bruno
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
Telmo.
Brent
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