On 23 March 2015 at 07:37, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > I don't think step 3 is at all essential to the argument. It's nothing > but setting up an analogy to Everett's MWI to show how uncertainty and > determinism are compatible - all of which JKC already accepts. >
I have put this point to him, but he says something like "because we can never see the consequences of the MWI split, but we *could* see the result of a teleporter duplication, therefore it's different" (that seems like the gist of the argument, at least). Bruno's point of course is just that if we had the teleporter, it would lead to indeterminacy, just as MWI splits do (indeed, if we take Everett literally, ISTM the MWI is an instance of Bruno's teleporter) - whether or not we can talk to our duplicate later is irrelevant to the point of the argument. ISTM that the flaws in comp, if they exist, are either (a) at the start - the premises are flawed (e.g. assumptions about the ontological status of Peano arithmetic), or (b) at the end - the MGA / "reversal" stage. The intermediate steps follow fairly straightforwardly from the premises (if they are assumed correct). So we're still at the point where John claims to have spotted a flaw, but he can't satisfactorily explain it to anyone else. When asks to do so he resorts to insults, irrelevant comments about the terminology, and mockery - the equivalent of a child putting its fingers in its ears, closing its eyes and singing loudly. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
