meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 12:33 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:

As I said, conterfactual correctness has very little to do with the actual conscious moment. That is given simply by the sequence of actual brain states --

But what is "a brain state". Can a part of the brain be ignored in some state but not in another?

Yes. See my previous comments about brain injuries, stroke, and suchlike.

this sequence does not really calculate anything. Computationalism ultimately rests on a confusion between a simulation and the calculations necessary to produce that simulation.

Computationalism is just the idea that conscious thought can be instantiated by digital device that simulates the brain at some sufficiently detailed level. If such a simulation is possible then it can be realized by a program running on a universal Turing machine. But that's an abstract process in Platonia and is independent of any physics or material existence. That's what the MGA purports to show.

Bruno has acknowledged that this is not what the MGA shows. MGA simply shows that his version of computationalism is incompatible with physical supervenience. This cannot be seen as surprising since it is explicitly built into computationalism that physicalism is false. The MGA is, therefore, largely irrelevant, because it does not prove anything that we didn't already know. It certainly does not show that consciousness is an abstract process in Plationia, independent of any physical process. That was the initial asssumption, and MGA simply shows that you can't have both computationalism *and* physicalism -- not that physical supervenience is false.

Bruce

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