On 31 March 2015 at 09:28, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically
>>> possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have.
>>> It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week
>>> but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the
>>> painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any
>>> visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning
>>> is left to attribute to the word "qualia"?
>>>
>>> Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic
>> replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having
>> their I/O matched to the rest of the brain.
>>
>> Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but
>> without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness.
>>
>
> And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which would
> mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and consciousness make no
> subjective difference, or equivalently that they don't exist.
>

Yes, exactly, partial zombies. This is sounding like Daniel Dennett's view,
that consciousness etc don't "really" exist but are a sort of illusion or
"user interface" or like "elan vital", some mysterious ineffable property
that science will do away with once we understand enough. I don't
necessarily believe this, but I need more than "an argument from
incredulity" to convince me that it's wrong.

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