On 29 Mar 2015, at 08:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
The calculation written out on paper is a static thing, but the
result of that calculation might still be part of a simulation
that produces consciousness. Though, unless Barbour is right and
the actuality of time can be statically encoded in his 'time
capsules (current memories of past instances)', I was thinking in
terms of a sequence of these states (however calculated).
Yes, I agree that the computation should not have to halt (compute
a function) in order to instantiate consciousness; it can just be a
sequence of states. Written out on paper it can be a sequence of
states ordered by position on the paper. But that seems absurd,
unless you think of it as consciousness in the context of a world
that is also written out on the paper, such that the writing that
is conscious is /*conscious of*/ this written out world.
My present conscious state includes visual, auditory and tactile
inputs -- these are part of the simulation. But they need simulate
only the effect on my brain states during that moment -- they do not
have to simulate the entire world that gave rise to these inputs.
The recreated conscuious state is not counterfactually accurate in
this respect, but so what? I am reproducing a few conscious moments,
not a fully functional person.
But in the MGA (or Olympia) we are asked to consider a device which
is a conscious AI and then we are led to suppose a radically broken
version of it works even though it is reduced to playing back a
record of its processes. I think the playback of the record fails
to produce consciousness because it is not counterfactually correct
and hence is not actually realizing the states of the AI - those
states essentially include that some branches were not taken.
Maudlin's invention of Klara is intended to overcome this objection
and provide a counterfactually correct but physically inert
sequence of states. But I think it Maudlin underestimates the
problem of context and the additions necessary for counterfactual
correctness will extend far beyond "the brain" and entail a
"world". These additions come for free when we say "Yes" to the
doctor replacing part of our brain because the rest of the world
that gave us context is still there. The doctor doesn't remove it.
In the "yes doctor" scenario as reported by Russell, it talks only
about replacing your brain with an AI program on a computer. It does
not mention connecting this to sense organs capable of reproducing
all the inputs one normally gets from the world. If this is not
clearly specified, I would certainly say 'No' to the doctor. There
is little point or future in being a functioning brain without
external inputs. As I recall sensory deprivation experiments,
subjects rapidly subside into a meaningless cycle of states -- or go
mad -- in the absence of sensory stimulation.
?
yes doctor assumes your brain is replaced in your skull, and correctly
interfaced with the other organs. I guess that can be implicit in some
presentation. That is step 0, or the definition of comp. Then, at step
6, you are plunged completely in a computer, but it is supposed to
simulate very well Moscow and Washungton, for some finite time. There
is no sensory deprivation in all situations involved in the reasoning.
Bruno
Bruce
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