On 29 Mar 2015, at 08:36, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 12:33 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
As I said, conterfactual correctness has very little to do with
the actual conscious moment. That is given simply by the sequence
of actual brain states --
But what is "a brain state". Can a part of the brain be ignored in
some state but not in another?
Yes. See my previous comments about brain injuries, stroke, and
suchlike.
this sequence does not really calculate anything. Computationalism
ultimately rests on a confusion between a simulation and the
calculations necessary to produce that simulation.
Computationalism is just the idea that conscious thought can be
instantiated by digital device that simulates the brain at some
sufficiently detailed level. If such a simulation is possible then
it can be realized by a program running on a universal Turing
machine. But that's an abstract process in Platonia and is
independent of any physics or material existence. That's what the
MGA purports to show.
Bruno has acknowledged that this is not what the MGA shows. MGA
simply shows that his version of computationalism is incompatible
with physical supervenience.
OK. Note that "my" version of computationalism is a weakening of all
other versions which usually assumes some neurophysical level of
susbtitution. It works even on Hamerov theory that the information
treatment is quantum and used tubulin internal to the neuronal cells.
An impressive evidence does exist, as protozoans anesthesia seems to
involve those molecules (well that's an evidence that the level might
be low, not that it exploits quantum computation, to be sure).
This cannot be seen as surprising since it is explicitly built into
computationalism that physicalism is false.
Oh! Not at all. Computationalism says nothing about this, in his
definition. I would not have consecrated my life showing that
computationalism is incompatible with physicalism if that was true.
Computationalism is just the hypothesis that my consciousness remains
invariant for a digital functional substitution done at some level.
The incompatibility with physicalism *is* the result of the UD-
Argument (UDA, the one made in 8 steps in sane04).
The mathematical theory uses this at the meta-level, and isolate a TOE
(the Robinson Arithmetic, which is PA without the induction axioms).
The MGA is, therefore, largely irrelevant, because it does not prove
anything that we didn't already know. It certainly does not show
that consciousness is an abstract process in Plationia, independent
of any physical process. That was the initial asssumption,
I would like you quote the passage which makes you think so. The
initial assumption are
1) The Church-Turing thesis (which needs arithmetical realism (AR),
but not as much as QM or any theory in physics). Sometimes I made
explicit the assumption of AR, but it is redundant with the Church-
Turing thesis.
2) "yes doctor", which sums up "it exists a substitution level where
my consciousness is invariant for a digital functional substitution.
There are no other assumption, and many materialists do believe in
comp, but of course they are unaware that physicalism get problematical.
and MGA simply shows that you can't have both computationalism *and*
physicalism --
Oh. Then you did understood what UDA shows (MGA is UDA step 8, in
sane04). This contradicts a bit what you said just above.
not that physical supervenience is false.
Indeed.
As a scientist, I never defend the truth or falsity of any theory. I
am agnostic. I like philosophy, but is not my job. On the contrary, I
show that some philosophy (the subject) can be done with the
scientific method.
As a logician, I just show what follows or does not follow from a set
of assumptions, or I show two set of assumptions being incompatible,
or independent, etc.
As a computer scientist, I show that Universal machine are already
quite intelligent, and competent, on those matter. They have already
an interesting theology, including already some parts of physics, and
it is a metter of work to develop them forward and refute a version of
computationalism (comp + knowledge obeys the axioms of S4).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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