On 30 Mar 2015, at 22:28, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote:
On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically
possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we
have.
It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week
but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the
painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any
visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning
is left to attribute to the word "qualia"?
Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic
replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite
having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain.
Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but
without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness.
And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which
would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and
consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that
they don't exist.
Yes, and this eventually show that we can believe in non-
computationalism if we are ready to believe in zombies, and partial
zombies.
Bruno
Did you survive with the artificial brain? "Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that,
I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I
feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel
no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no
difference ... cling ...
That would mean there is something else involved, something that
isn't generated by computation.
That would entail that indeed.
But computationalism is not claiming that there is not something
else involved, indeed the "true" relations, as in the difference
between []p & p and []p. This relates the machine to a non nameable
first person knower.
I think Brent intuit this. He use the term "our world" for that, and
this is the "<>t" added to the []p to get a "physical world" (before
"comp" which will be the restriction of the sigma_1 sentences). It
is an indexical conception of world: this reality (in which I
believe).
Consciousness and computation are not related to the static
representations but in their true relations.
The sigma_1 relations, and only them, verifies p <-> []p, the logic
avoids collapse, because <>p is not sigma_1.
So, those sigma_1 relation collapse truth and representations, at
that level, but self-reference and measurement complexifies the logic.
Truth extends computability, in fact provability extends
computability, in the constructive or not, transfinite. But Truth
extends properly all machines' provabilities, or the locally
effective sets of belief, as the machine can discover when
introspecting itself (in the Gödel, Post, Kleene manner).
I might need to explain to you the difference, that you might know
well, but still discard from the theory, between the truth that 2 +
2 = 4, and a proof of this, for example provided by some proving
machine.
Then you need to understand the working of a computer, or of any
universal (Turing) system, and understand how they all can implement
each others. Given that elementary arithmetic is such a system, a
computation can be defined by relations between numbers.
At the sigma_1 (or sigma_0) level truth fuse with provability, but
when machine looks at themselves the complexity crops well above the
sigma_1 level, and the relations between p and []p get, well, more
complicated (that is why we get 8 hypostases).
Consistency (<>t) is Pi_1 and is the typical truth about the machine
that the machine cannot justified about herself: but she can
discover the fact as she can justified <>t -> ~[]<>t, and actually
missing []<>t. With the Plato lexicon this gives all Protagorean
virtue including intelligence (by the definition I gave).
The protagorean virtue are those which leads to the contrary when
(self, or not!) asserted: they are the proposition or state
attribute obeying []x -> ~x. Like moral, happiness, conscience,
intelligence, love, security, and also the unnameable attributes.
Smullyan's "Forever Undecidable" is a good introduction to the logic
of self-reference. By a famous succession of theorems, a simple
couple of modal logic, G and G*, sums it all at the 3p propositional
level. And that is enough to define the variants []p & p in G (in
the machine language term, or arithmetic).
When the universal machine introspects, she already get
contradictory intuition about reality and herself. But she can
overcome them, in different ways and modes.
Bruno
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