On 31 Mar 2015, at 17:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 30 Mar 2015, at 22:28, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote:
On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou
<[email protected]> wrote:
Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically
possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we
have.
It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week
but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the
painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any
visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning
is left to attribute to the word "qualia"?
Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic
replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite
having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain.
Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but
without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness.
And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which
would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and
consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that
they don't exist.
Yes, and this eventually show that we can believe in non-
computationalism if we are ready to believe in zombies, and partial
zombies.
Bruno
Did you survive with the artificial brain? "Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ...
A partial zombie would mean that you do feel different but you don't
notice that you feel different. This applies not only to a
difference you might conceivably not notice, like colour reversal,
but to a gross sensory or cognitive deficit, such as going
completely blind or losing the ability to understand language. It
seems to me that if you allow that such things can happen without
you or anyone else noticing then the whole idea of consciousness is
spurious.
I think we agree on this. I have to think more if that can lead to a
proof of computationalism, due to possible agnosologia (if that term
is correct). I can imagine someone feeling less conscious, but losing
all memories of having been more conscious, so that he does not feel
the difference (like people becoming blind, but not noticing it). I am
just the advocate of the devil, here.
Bruno
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
