On 01 Apr 2015, at 21:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 1 April 2015, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 31 Mar 2015, at 17:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 30 Mar 2015, at 22:28, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote:
On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou
<stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically
possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we
have.
It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last
week
but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the
painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any
visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what
meaning
is left to attribute to the word "qualia"?
Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic
replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite
having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain.
Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but
without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness.
And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies,
which would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and
consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that
they don't exist.
Yes, and this eventually show that we can believe in non-
computationalism if we are ready to believe in zombies, and partial
zombies.
Bruno
Did you survive with the artificial brain? "Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about
that, I feel no difference ... cling ...
A partial zombie would mean that you do feel different but you
don't notice that you feel different. This applies not only to a
difference you might conceivably not notice, like colour reversal,
but to a gross sensory or cognitive deficit, such as going
completely blind or losing the ability to understand language. It
seems to me that if you allow that such things can happen without
you or anyone else noticing then the whole idea of consciousness is
spurious.
I think we agree on this. I have to think more if that can lead to a
proof of computationalism, due to possible agnosologia (if that term
is correct). I can imagine someone feeling less conscious, but
losing all memories of having been more conscious, so that he does
not feel the difference (like people becoming blind, but not
noticing it). I am just the advocate of the devil, here.
Anosognosia is the inability to recognise when you have an illness
or a disability, usually in the context of neurological or
psychiatric disorders. This differs from being a zombie in that
behaviour is affected: if the patient suffers from cortical
blindness with anosognosia, they are unable to recognise what is in
front of them and walk into things. In addition, they not only have
the deficit of lacking qualia, they have a specific delusional
belief which cannot be shifted despite any evidence they might be
presented with.
You are right about anosognosia. But my point is that anosognosia
might make conceivable partial zombiness, and thus comp or your
functionalism false. Again, I agree that it would make consciousness
spurious, but that is something to be expected from a computationalist
believing in primitive matter. I just try to put myself in the mind of
those people believing in both matter and mechanism.
Bruno
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
