On Wednesday, 1 April 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote:
> > On 31 Mar 2015, at 17:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 30 Mar 2015, at 22:28, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically >>>> possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. >>>> It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week >>>> but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the >>>> painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any >>>> visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning >>>> is left to attribute to the word "qualia"? >>>> >>>> Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic >>> replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having >>> their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but >>> without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness. >>> >> >> And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which would >> mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and consciousness make no >> subjective difference, or equivalently that they don't exist. >> >> >> Yes, and this eventually show that we can believe in non-computationalism >> if we are ready to believe in zombies, and partial zombies. >> >> Bruno >> >> *Did you survive with the artificial brain? "Oh, yes, no doubt about >> that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I >> feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no >> difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference >> ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling >> ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, >> yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no >> doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt >> about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about >> that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I >> feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no >> difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference >> ... cling ... * >> > > A partial zombie would mean that you do feel different but you don't > notice that you feel different. This applies not only to a difference you > might conceivably not notice, like colour reversal, but to a gross sensory > or cognitive deficit, such as going completely blind or losing the ability > to understand language. It seems to me that if you allow that such things > can happen without you or anyone else noticing then the whole idea of > consciousness is spurious. > > > I think we agree on this. I have to think more if that can lead to a proof > of computationalism, due to possible agnosologia (if that term is correct). > I can imagine someone feeling less conscious, but losing all memories of > having been more conscious, so that he does not feel the difference (like > people becoming blind, but not noticing it). I am just the advocate of the > devil, here. > Anosognosia is the inability to recognise when you have an illness or a disability, usually in the context of neurological or psychiatric disorders. This differs from being a zombie in that behaviour is affected: if the patient suffers from cortical blindness with anosognosia, they are unable to recognise what is in front of them and walk into things. In addition, they not only have the deficit of lacking qualia, they have a specific delusional belief which cannot be shifted despite any evidence they might be presented with. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
