On 30 Mar 2015, at 02:57, LizR wrote:
On 29 March 2015 at 21:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
wrote:
As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have
not yet seen any argument that might lead me to change my mind.
One reason that has been suggested is the "unreasonable
effectiveness" of maths as a description of physics. This is Max
Tegmark's argument for the "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis". To
take this to its logical conclusion, if we ever formulate a theory
that (as far as we know) describes everything that exists - a real
live TOE - then, Tegmark would say, what is there that distinguishes
the universe from the, by hypothesis completely accurate,
description? His conclusion is nothing, and since the maths
description is simpler than the observed universe, the scientific
conclusion is that what we observe is a part of a multiverse
containing all outcomes of the TOE (this is a bit like Russell's
TON, with the equations of the TOE as the "almost nothing" that
actually exists) - and that assuming the universe is anything more
than just "What the maths looks like from the inside" is unnecessary
- and untestable - metaphysical speculation.
?
On the contary: what arithmetic looks from inside can be made precise
when the observer is assumed to be Turing emulable. The math is
computer science, with the mathematical definition of computer.
Then the math, to be short, says: it looks like Parmenides, Plotinus,
and the mystics. It feels like there is:
1)a big ONE without a name, a part of which is
2) the Intelligible part (and that part is actually far bigger or far
more complex than the big ONE, which is relatively simple), and then
there is
3) the universal soul, which is the fire in the equation, and actually
makes a lot of mess in Platonia, but perhaps the worst is to come, as
there are:
4) the intelligible matter (death and taxes), and
5) the sensible matter (which can hurt).
Those are the five hypotheses of Parmenides, and they are recovered
with the nuances:
p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p
That gives eight important distinct modes in which a universal machine
can see herself and the math which encompass her. (8, not 5, as three
modes inherit the G/G*split).
However we don't have such a TOE as yet,
Hmm... I guess you have lost your notes diary again.
With computationalism, it is a fair simplification to say that each
universal machine is a TOE. Any first order specification of any one
among them would do the same job, and lead to the same mind-body
problem, and the same mind and body solution, but I have chosen
"elementary arithmetic" and "SK-combinators" to fix the things.
An excellent introduction to the SK-combinators is the book "How to
mock a mockingbird?" by Raymond Smullyan.
I could have chosen any UTM, including you or Winston Churchill, any
one would do. Well, better to use a TOE which is simple, so that we
can trust that its elementary assumption/belief make sense.
Bruno
The governement: We have to cut the budget of education to pay the
soldiers.
Churchill: Then tell me what the soldiers are supposed to fight for.
so it's possible it will turn out to be non-mathematical, in which
case Max's argument will sink without trace.
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