On 01 Apr 2015, at 12:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If just one physical law cannot be deduced from them, it means that
computationalism is false, and that consciousness requires
something else (God, primitive actual matter, or something that we
just not yet conceive).
I would like to see just one non-trivial physical law that has been
deduced from comp.
All violation of classical tautologies by QM appears to be those
violated by the comp QM.
I provide a theorem prover for the propositional logic of the
observable.
Comp rediscovers physics in the opposite direction than physics: we
see first the many-worlds/dreams, then the logic to which they obey,
etc. The hardest thing will be the hamiltonian, unless it is
geographical, in which case comp predicts universe with different
hamiltonians.
Then comp predict, as a law of physics, the presence of consciousness,
that is believer in theological and physical realities, which physics
does not yet address, etc. May be read the second part of the sane04
paper, and asks me from that. In a sense, comp predicts that black
hole restore information when evaporating, as it predicts that at the
physical bottom everything is reversible (modulo technical nuances but
they are too much long to explain now, especially if you have still
not grasp the logic of the UDA).
But this is besides the point of the UDA, which shows that to solve
the consciousness problem, a derivation of physics from arithmetic is
mandatory.
I am only interested in the mind-body problem. Using computationalism
and its phsyics to do physics, would be like using Quantum Loop
Gravity to do basket ball.
In some of my first talk, a long time ago, I pretended that comp was
refuted, because if we look at ourselves below our substitution level,
we should find the trace of infinities of computations, and QM
predicts only one (as I will use QM for years in molecular biology,
and take time to doubt the collapse which I was taught to be an
experimental fact!). I will have to read Everett to realize that QM is
quite an ally for the comp idea.
Keep in mind that I am not proposing any new theory, I just show the
epistemological incompatibility between the comp theory of
consciousness (mechanism, we are machine, or we are Turing emulable)
and Aristotelian physics (there is an ontologically real primitive
universe, or we have to postulate a physical universe). I submit a
problem. The shy solution got by interviewing he machine just shows it
make sense, and that to refute comp would need well, to compare the
logics of the observable given by the universal machine and the logic
of the observable inferred by empirical analysis.
Also, thanks to the machine interview, a computationalist know that
there is a physical reality, with laws applying to all universal
machine. So comp introduces a new kind of invariant: it is invariant
for the TOEs used, as long as they are rich enough to define an UTM.
Bruno
Bruce
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