On 01 Apr 2015, at 02:05, LizR wrote:
On 1 April 2015 at 03:58, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 30 Mar 2015, at 02:57, LizR wrote:
On 29 March 2015 at 21:04, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have
not yet seen any argument that might lead me to change my mind.
One reason that has been suggested is the "unreasonable
effectiveness" of maths as a description of physics. This is Max
Tegmark's argument for the "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis". To
take this to its logical conclusion, if we ever formulate a theory
that (as far as we know) describes everything that exists - a real
live TOE - then, Tegmark would say, what is there that
distinguishes the universe from the, by hypothesis completely
accurate, description? His conclusion is nothing, and since the
maths description is simpler than the observed universe, the
scientific conclusion is that what we observe is a part of a
multiverse containing all outcomes of the TOE (this is a bit like
Russell's TON, with the equations of the TOE as the "almost
nothing" that actually exists) - and that assuming the universe is
anything more than just "What the maths looks like from the inside"
is unnecessary - and untestable - metaphysical speculation.
?
On the contary: what arithmetic looks from inside can be made
precise when the observer is assumed to be Turing emulable. The math
is computer science, with the mathematical definition of computer.
As we have remarked previously, Max hasn't really dealt with the
observer in his mathematical universe hypothesis. I used the MUH as
an example of a reason to believe that one should perhaps prefer
"Platonia" to physicalism because I feel it's a fairly
straightforward example, without any need to worry about - for
example - the nature of consciousness.
OK, but we have to take it into account if we want explain mind and
matter.
Then the math, to be short, says: it looks like Parmenides,
Plotinus, and the mystics. It feels like there is:
1)a big ONE without a name, a part of which is
2) the Intelligible part (and that part is actually far bigger or
far more complex than the big ONE, which is relatively simple), and
then there is
3) the universal soul, which is the fire in the equation, and
actually makes a lot of mess in Platonia, but perhaps the worst is
to come, as there are:
4) the intelligible matter (death and taxes), and
5) the sensible matter (which can hurt).
Those are the five hypotheses of Parmenides, and they are recovered
with the nuances:
p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p
That gives eight important distinct modes in which a universal
machine can see herself and the math which encompass her. (8, not 5,
as three modes inherit the G/G*split).
However we don't have such a TOE as yet,
Hmm... I guess you have lost your notes diary again.
With computationalism, it is a fair simplification to say that each
universal machine is a TOE. Any first order specification of any one
among them would do the same job, and lead to the same mind-body
problem, and the same mind and body solution, but I have chosen
"elementary arithmetic" and "SK-combinators" to fix the things.
Well, no, there is no TOE that describes all features of the
physical universe yet.
But if comp is true, there is. If comp is true, the theory with the
axioms Kxy = x + Sxyz = xy(zy), or elementary arithmetic HAVE TO
describe all feature of the physical universe. If not comp is false.
With comp, we cannot add anything to elementary arithmetic or to any
sigma-1 complete set. That is the point of the reasoning. That we
don't succeed, or have not yet extracted it is another point. The TOE
is there. All the physical (but non geographical, nor historical)
feature of physics must be explained by elementary arithmetic, or
computationalism is false. That follows from the UDA.
String theory and comp are both attempts at this (from very
different starting points) but I don't believe either has reached
the point where they can say (for example) "the universe should
appear to conserve energy, be Lorentz invariant, exhibit a
fundamental uncertainty of various quantities, etc".
Not really, but a case can be made that we have already explained
where the symmetries come from, and thus (by Noether) the (future,
when we know what is energy) conservation of energy, the quantum
logic, etc.
But even without that, comp has given the TOE. That we humans cannot
still extract physics is another point. It might take many years, or
even millenia, but then we get already the propositional theology,
including the logic of the observable, and the reason why the measure
exists (the existence of quantization, the symmetry of the physical
"bottom", the many "worlds", etc.
The UDA just nullifies the use of any extra-axioms. The physical
"universe" is really in the head of all universal machine. We, the
Löbian machine, *are* the TOE.
The following two theories are TOEs (when assuming comp)
(a = b and a = c) -> b = c
a = b -> b = a
S≠K
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
and
Predicate logic +
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
If just one physical law cannot be deduced from them, it means that
computationalism is false, and that consciousness requires something
else (God, primitive actual matter, or something that we just not yet
conceive).
I hope I will succeed in explaining you this. With comp, the mind-body
problem is reduced into extracting physics from any definition of any
UTMs, as they have to hallucinate the same physics. It makes the two
theories above complete and equivalent theory of everything. String
theory, if correct, is redundant, and is suspect of treachery
(inspiration or copy on nature). It does not address the mind, also.
An excellent introduction to the SK-combinators is the book "How to
mock a mockingbird?" by Raymond Smullyan.
I have that book - and every other book he's written, I think. My
son has worn some of them out, actually, but then he understands
logic and maths about a million times better than me.
That happens, with young people. I hope this does not discourage you,
and on the contrary: you can ask him questions. We are working on
something which is not simple, and computer science is not well known.
(And then logicians themselves have had an hard work to be consider as
"real" mathematicians, so very few like the idea to come back to apply
logic in metaphysics/theology (where logic is born, though). Some
believe that logic has explained away metaphysics, as spurious, but
that is an influence of Vienna positivism, and has been refuted, even
by Wittgenstein, notably. Logicians have the right tools, and
physicists have the right questions, but they are rarely able to
listen to each other.
Exercise: find a paragraph in "Forever Undecided" which shows that
Smullyan take Aristotle metaphysics for granted.
Bruno
I could have chosen any UTM, including you or Winston Churchill, any
one would do. Well, better to use a TOE which is simple, so that we
can trust that its elementary assumption/belief make sense.
Bruno
The governement: We have to cut the budget of education to pay the
soldiers.
Churchill: Then tell me what the soldiers are supposed to fight for.
so it's possible it will turn out to be non-mathematical, in which
case Max's argument will sink without trace.
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