On 1 April 2015 at 03:58, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 30 Mar 2015, at 02:57, LizR wrote: > > On 29 March 2015 at 21:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have not yet >> seen any argument that might lead me to change my mind. > > > One reason that has been suggested is the "unreasonable effectiveness" of > maths as a description of physics. This is Max Tegmark's argument for the > "Mathematical Universe Hypothesis". To take this to its logical conclusion, > if we ever formulate a theory that (as far as we know) describes everything > that exists - a real live TOE - then, Tegmark would say, what is there that > distinguishes the universe from the, by hypothesis completely accurate, > description? His conclusion is nothing, and since the maths description is > simpler than the observed universe, the scientific conclusion is that what > we observe is a part of a multiverse containing all outcomes of the TOE > (this is a bit like Russell's TON, with the equations of the TOE as the > "almost nothing" that actually exists) - and that assuming the universe is > anything more than just "What the maths looks like from the inside" is > unnecessary - and untestable - metaphysical speculation. > > > ? > On the contary: what arithmetic looks from inside can be made precise when > the observer is assumed to be Turing emulable. The math is computer > science, with the mathematical definition of computer. > > As we have remarked previously, Max hasn't really dealt with the observer in his mathematical universe hypothesis. I used the MUH as an example of a reason to believe that one should perhaps prefer "Platonia" to physicalism because I feel it's a fairly straightforward example, without any need to worry about - for example - the nature of consciousness.
> Then the math, to be short, says: it looks like Parmenides, Plotinus, and > the mystics. It feels like there is: > > 1)a big ONE without a name, a part of which is > 2) the Intelligible part (and that part is actually far bigger or far more > complex than the big ONE, which is relatively simple), and then there is > 3) the universal soul, which is the fire in the equation, and actually > makes a lot of mess in Platonia, but perhaps the worst is to come, as there > are: > 4) the intelligible matter (death and taxes), and > 5) the sensible matter (which can hurt). > > Those are the five hypotheses of Parmenides, and they are recovered with > the nuances: > > p > []p > []p & p > []p & <>t > []p & <>t & p > > That gives eight important distinct modes in which a universal machine can > see herself and the math which encompass her. (8, not 5, as three modes > inherit the G/G*split). > > However we don't have such a TOE as yet, > > > Hmm... I guess you have lost your notes diary again. > With computationalism, it is a fair simplification to say that each > universal machine is a TOE. Any first order specification of any one among > them would do the same job, and lead to the same mind-body problem, and the > same mind and body solution, but I have chosen "elementary arithmetic" and > "SK-combinators" to fix the things. > Well, no, there is no TOE that describes all features of the physical universe yet. String theory and comp are both attempts at this (from very different starting points) but I don't believe either has reached the point where they can say (for example) "the universe should appear to conserve energy, be Lorentz invariant, exhibit a fundamental uncertainty of various quantities, etc". > > An excellent introduction to the SK-combinators is the book "How to mock a > mockingbird?" by Raymond Smullyan. > I have that book - and every other book he's written, I think. My son has worn some of them out, actually, but then he understands logic and maths about a million times better than me. > > I could have chosen any UTM, including you or Winston Churchill, any one > would do. Well, better to use a TOE which is simple, so that we can trust > that its elementary assumption/belief make sense. > > Bruno > > The governement: We have to cut the budget of education to pay the > soldiers. > Churchill: Then tell me what the soldiers are supposed to fight for. > > > > > > > so it's possible it will turn out to be non-mathematical, in which case > Max's argument will sink without trace. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
