On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:36, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Apr 2015, at 13:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
To be more precise, I should explain you how "computations" and
"emulation" is defined in arithmetic, in term of the truth of
elementary number theoretical relations. A computation will exist
through the fact that it is true that some numbers divide some
other numbers, and other facts like that. On the contrary, a
description of a computation will be a number from which we can
extract the description of a sequence of states, but that is
different from the states existence being the result of a set of
true relation.
So you can use these terms in that way. But that does not make
'computation' a dynamical concept.
It is not a physical time related concept. But computer, or
universal number (or universal combinators) needs only a discrete
static "time": 0, 1, 2, 3, ..
OK, but that is an ordering parameter and it does not make the
computational dynamical rather than static.
It does not make the computational dynamical in the physical sense,
but we don't need that as physics will have to be derived from the
first person experience associated to the non physical computation.
To ease the understanding, it is better to not assume a primary
physical reality, nor to assume it does not exist, and to follow
precisely the reasoning. As it is counter-intuitive, it is the only
way to avoid the use of some prejudice we can have in such domain.
There is no change or movement involved. Arithmetic is completely
static, as are the relations between numbers.
Block universe are static too. It is the point of a relativity
theory. Time and space comes from comparison between clock and
meter, nothing can prevent the sigma_1 reality to emulates all
those comparisons , and by assuming computationalism, of the
conscious entities which make sense of the comparisons.
It is similar to the block universe view in that your internal
ordering parameter is entirely static. But the analogy is not
perfect for what you want to do with comp. The physical block
universe is often referred to in terms of two separate points of
view: the 'bird' view which is from the outside,
It corresponds loosely to what I call the third person point of view,
except it is not based on physical notion, like "universe".
from which (entirely metaphorical) view, the universe is static; and
the 'frog' view from within, from which view the universe is
dynamical.
Here we will have the first person view, but it is a psychological
notion, and again, not related a priori with the physical. Indeed, in
the math part we get the 1-view with adding " & p" to the provability
predicate. To get physics we will need the weaker " & <>t", or both "
& <>t & p". But here I anticipate.
Note that in Everett Tegmark, the 1-view is given by the relative
states, and the 3-view by the universal wave, or matrix. But 1-3 view
is a much refined, and psychological notion, than bird and frog.
In this case the bird (block) view is completely equivalent to a
recording of the experiences of the frog in real time.
Here your analogy breaks down. The "ultimate" 3-view, in the TOE
extracted from comp, is the arithmetical reality. It is statical, but
is not a recording. the computation exists due to the truth of some
relation between numbers, and not from the description of those truth.
That is a key difference, which cannot be understood if you have a
"conventionalist" view of mathematics. The arithmetical reality kicks
back, and indeed, incompleteness is a product of that difference.
Einstein resists to this all his life, but in the book by Pale
Yourgreau, I got evidence that eventually Gödel makes him realize that
difference.
Because the time parameter is defined internally, the recording can
be run as often as required by the bird, and the result (and
conscious experiences of the frog) are identical every time.
There is no consciousness in a recording, or associable to a
recording. There is just no computation there, only a description of a
computation. I think I will have to make a thread on only this, as it
is subtle and people can easily be confused. That is also what is made
utterly clear in Gödel's work, but then it is no less subtle, even if
it is a particular case of the difference between the number 89 and
the description "89".
The same thing would happen in the static view of the dovetailer
with states ordered by the step number. The whole shebang would be
no different from a recording of the same shebang --
That is a reason to doubt in a mono-universe block reality, but the
problem is solved with a block multi-universe. I mean that this is
conceivable. No problem with arithmetic, which internalize all the
counterfactuals, and the computations, by abstraction. This will also
solidify the idea that consciousness is an abstract higher order
logical relation, and not something produced by token-like happening.
in fact, it is a recording because it is static from the external
view. The experience of time by the internal consciousness emulated
is exactly the same for 'reruns' of the same portion of the
dovetailer's output by some external 'bird' observer.
No recording can be conscious. Only an "abstract" person, which lives
in "platonia", associated to computations, which are both abstract,
and relatively concrete from inside.
Now, as I understand it, you want to avoid this conclusion by
appealing to the notion of counterfactual correctness. The
particular sequence of states is not itself conscious because it is
not counterfactually correct -- given a different environment, that
sequence of states would give the same conscious experience, not
some modified experience. It is just a recording, after all.
Your model then appeals to the idea of the infinite number of
separate occasions that that same set of internal states occurs in
the overall picture of the dovetailer, and you claim that, in some
sense, the 'actual' conscious experience is a 'sum' over these
separate emulations, even though they be separated by many billions
of computational steps of the dovetailer. I put words like 'actual'
and 'sum' in scare quotes because I do not think these ideas make
much sense.
No, that is the problem we will need to solve, already at step seven.
The immateriality comes from the MGA. To associate consciousness to
one computation through its primary physical instantiations leads to
associate consciousness to description, even to empty one, and that
does not make sense. The FPI just lead to the "matter problem".
You appeal to techniques like the Feynman sum over paths in QM to
make sense of your model.
It helps people, when they already understood Everett. But it is not
part of the reasoning.
But that analogy fails because the Feynman sum is merely a
calculational technique -- it does not correspond to and actual sum
of separate really existing things that nature somehow 'performs' to
get a particle from A to B. It is a calculational heuristic,
In Copenhagen, but for (out-of-topic) reason, I don't believe this. I
just forgot that you are a Copenhagen defender. I would have reminded
this, I would have avoid that explanation.
and like so much in quantum mechanics, reifying computational tricks
leads to endless problems.
We might come back on this. I don't see how QM can explain the two
slits without some amount of that reification.
For example, the Feynman diagrams as used in field theory are terms
in a perturbation expansion, they do not have separate independent
existence. It is only the sum that is physical, and that same result
can be obtained by many other calculational techniques that never
mention Feynman diagrams.
One problem that occurs to me is: "who does this sum over dovetailer
states?"
You give the correct answer just below:
FPI would suggest that there is no such sum. The future of the
'person' experiencing that conscious moment is indeterminate -- the
person cannot predict the future in anything other than a
probabilistic way.
Yes. And that is the answer. The sum results from the FPI.
But that makes each conscious moment unique,
That is the case for conscious state. they are 1-unique, but 3-
multiple (even 3-1 multiple).
and actually a static recording of itself
?
-- just as in the block universe view of physics. Again, FPI of the
dovetailer has nothing in common with indeterminacy in quantum
mechanics. Mere external similarity does not imply equivalence.
The FPI is used, implicitly or explicitly, in the MWI, but, a priori,
in comp, we have a measure problem, that we cannot solve by invoking a
physical thing like a universal wave. With comp, we have to justify
the universal wave itself. It is the reasoning which imposes the
equivalence. I don't pretend it is equivalent, but I explain why comp
put a measure, and that the comparison between that measure (or the
particular case of the measure one and its logic) can be compared with
the empirical one, making comp testable, and indeed partially tested.
Bruno
Bruce
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