On Sat, Apr 04, 2015 at 03:35:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 04 Apr 2015, at 01:29, Russell Standish wrote: > > >On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 06:33:52PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >>On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote: > >> > >>> > >>>The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the > >>>argument if you assume that ontological reality > >> > >>I guess you mean here: physical ontological reality (assuming it > >>exists). > >> > >> > >>> > >>>If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia), > >> > >>You really mean: robust physical ontology. > > > >No, because the label physical should refer to what is phenomenal, > >otherwise it doesn't have any meaning. > > ? > But then it seems you assume what we want to prove.
Not at all. After quite some to-and-fro with you about what "physical" actually means, we settled on phenomena (things like matter, forces and the like). > > I have introduced the term "robust" only for the physical universe > (be it ontological or phenomenological). It is just what makes an > entire (never ending) physical universal dovetailing possible. > That does not make sense. Already by the time you have introduced the term, you have shown that a robust ontology (one capable of running the UD) cannot be physical (ie the phenomena). > > > >The Church Thesis (true by > >assumption) shows that what is phenomenal cannot be ontological (or > >noumenal, to borrow Kant's term), when the ontology is robust. That is > >pretty much the whole point of UDA1-7. > > What does it mean than an ontology is robust? UD* is "robust" in > arithmetic by definition. > Sure. And if arithmetic is your ontology, your ontology is robust. > The point of UDA1-7 is only that if we assume the physical universe > run a UD, then physics is a branch of arithmetic/computer science. > OK if your replace "physical" with "ontology" > > > > > > >> > >>>Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as > >>>recordings can be fully counterfactually correct. > >> > >> > >>By adding the inert Klara? But then the physical role of the inert > >>Klara to produce consciousness to the movie is not Turing emulable, > >>and you stop assuming computationalism. > > > >But in a robust ontology, the Klaras are no longer inert. They > >cannot be. > > I don't know what is a robust ontology. It looks that you mean by > this an everything ontology, or a many-world or many states or many > computations ontology. Sure. > But in that case the Klara are still inert in the relevant branch > where we do the reasoning. So I am not sure to see the relevance of > the remark here. > We cannot seperate the branches in this way. > > > > > >> > >>I can understand the role of Klara and counterfactual correctness > >>for the computation and behavior being correct hen change occur, but > >>how could they change the consciousness by being non present when > >>not needed? > >> > > > >If they are not needed, then some non-counterfactually correct > >recordings can be conscious. > > That is right, but that is the path to the reductio ad absurdum. > > > >I don't have a strong opinion on this, as > >the relevant recordings will be really very complex, but do suspect, > >along with Brent, that full embodiment in an environment is needed, > >along with counterfactual correctness. > > ? > Then they are no more recordings, but computation. > Then what is your definition of a recording? In my eyes, UD* is a recording, particularly a finite portion of it, such as the first 10,000 steps of the first 10,000 programs. > > > > > >As I point out in my paper, that, physical supervenience, and the > >MGA entails > >a robust ontology (ie something like the Multiverse to exist). > > You mean a primitively physical multiverse? > That would already be a quite non trivial result, but I don't see > how you get it. Not where "physical"="phenomenal". UDA7 already proves that a robust ontology cannot be physical. If you mean something else by physical, I have no idea what you mean. IIRC, the discussion went something like this: Q: "What does 'primitively physical' mean?" A: "The ontology on which you run the UD" Q: "Oh, so you mean numbers?" A: "No, number are not physical" Q: "Then what?" A: "Things like protons and electrons, magnetic force and so on" Q: "Oh so like phenomenal things, things we can directly measure?" A: "Yes". Q: "Then if we assume the ontology is rich enough to be able to run the UD, the Church-Turing thesis means that any such ontology will deliver identical phenomenal outcomes, so there is no way of identifying the ontology with what is physical." A: "OK. Now let us assume that the 'primitive physical ontology' is not-robust, ie incapable of running a UD" Q: "Did you mean ontology or the physical?" A: "Could be both, because the ontological limitations introduced by being non-robust can affect the phenomenal, hence are phenomena in themselves, hence physical." Q: OK. > That would be weird because it would prove that if can prove the > existence of primitive matter in arithmetic. I am a bit confused. > How so? I don't follow you there. > Cheers, > > Bruno > > > > > >Cheers > >-- > > > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > >Principal, High Performance Coders > >Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] > >University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > >Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret > > (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > >-- > >You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >Groups "Everything List" group. > >To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > >send an email to [email protected]. > >To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > >Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > >For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
