On 05 Apr 2015, at 22:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/5/2015 9:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you mean something else by physical, I have no idea what you
mean.
It is what is studied by physics, mainly through empirical means:
the measurable quantities in laboratories.
Aristotle (well mainly its followers) assume that the physical
reality is irreducible, so that we have to assume
primitively physical objects, like atoms, particles, 3d spaces, or
today, strings for example. It makes physics the fundamental
science (physicalism).
I was just saying that arithmetic is not a branch of physics, that
numbers, sets, functions, are, by virtue of their
definitions, not physical. More below.
That's like saying electrons are not physical because they're
defined by Dirac's equation.
The point is that if computationalism is correct and if electron are
physical, ostensively observable, you have to justify their
"observability" from the global FPI or the logic of stable prediction
(given by []p & <>t with p sigma_1).
"Physical" just means we can interact with it in our common, non-
solipist world and reach intersubjective agreement about it.
No problem, but we need to explain this, without invoking some magical
matter selecting magically a computations among others, that is
without endowing universal machine with an non Turing emulable ability
to distinguish that magic physicalness from the ocean of computations
provided by arithmetic (already assumed by physicists).
It's no more magic than supposing prime numbers exist because
they're defined by axiom systems.
Then there is a flaw in the UDA, ... or computationalism is false, and
some other "universal being" is at play, with non Turing emulable
power. Calling it Matter or God only escapes the question without
answering. Or, we are in a perverse simulation which try to fail us
(which I doubt, unless evidences is found like a discrepancy between
nature and the logic of the machine-observable. But up to now, it
fits. So the matter move and the abandon of comp would be premature.
It is the simplest theory for both consciousness, and apparently matter.
Bruno
Brent
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