Right, but *who* to punish in order to deter is dependent on these
questions of identity. Suppose there are three actors who are willing to do
this delayed duplication murder suicide scheme. Furthermore, they don't
care what happens to their duplicate. (Perhaps they think of him as someone
else) However, each have a family member that the care about deeply. You
tell the first that his duplicate will be punished if he commits his crime.
He doesn't care. You then say you will transfer the punishment onto his
family member. This would deter him, but he doesn't believe you are
actually so utilitarian and so he carries out his plans. Now, there are
still two would be murderers. Do you punish the first man's family member
in order to prove you mean business, deterring the remaining actors?

On purely utilitarian grounds, there is just as much disutility generated
when you punish the first actor's duplicate as when you punish the first
actor's family member. Furthermore, unless we reolve this question of
identity who this disutility is doled out to doesn't matter as long as it
serves its deterrent purpose.

On Monday, April 27, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>  You make a rule about punishing people that will deter them from
> committing crimes in a way that maximizes satisfaction in the community.
> I'm not sure what rules that is, but it doesn't necessarily have to solve
> some philosophical problem of personal identity.
>
> In your example, suppose society said, "No we won't punish him."  Then
> people might be tempted to use this as a way of killing someone they hate.
> So society would probably say, "Yes, we'll punish him...and any additional
> copies of him too."
>
> Brent
>
> On 4/27/2015 1:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> What if you step into a delayed duplication machine, and the first one out
> goes and commits murder at a later time, and then commits suicide, later
> the delayed duplicate of you emerges. Do we imprison them, or would that be
> punishing them for a "pre-crime"?
>
>  Jason
>
> On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 7:19 PM, LizR <[email protected]
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote:
>
>> You should both go to jail, on the basis that both copies of you had the
>> same consciousness as the person who committed the murder, and therefore
>> you are both equally responsible (leaving aside considerations of free will
>> etc)
>>
>>  And (this is the clincher) you are both equally a danger to society,
>> having had your psychopathic tendencies duplicated means you're twice as
>> much of a danger as you were when there was only one of you.
>>
>>  QED, "You're nicked, sunshine."
>>
>
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