On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
All computational supervenience gets you is that two counterfactually > equivalent programs will generate the same conscious state. All bets > are off with counterfactually inequivalent programs that nevertheless > result in the same physical state. For that you additionally need > physical supervenience. > > The whole business of the recording is how can that physical apparatus > replaying the conscious moment actually be conscious, when it is not > aware of the environment. As far as computationalism is concerned, the > experienced moment has already been experienced, at some previous time > and place (there and then). Replaying the recording makes no > difference whatsoever. Yet the same sequence of physical states takes > place, so in some sense by physical supervenience a new conscious > moment is created. I don't think it can be, and I don't think this is > what physical supervenience can actually mean. > Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. there was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first time? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
