On 08 May 2015, at 10:24, LizR wrote:
On 8 May 2015 at 19:14, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 08 May 2015, at 02:35, Russell Standish wrote:
This is why I draw the comparison with the Chinese room. If all the
intelligence is encoded in a book, then intuition says that book
cannot be conscious. This intuition is undoubtedly right for the sorts
of books we're used to. But for a book that is much, much larger than
the visible universe (which it would have to be to encode the
intelligence needed to answer the questions in Chinese as a lookup
table), then I think that intuition is very much
doubtful. Consequently, the Chinese Room argument fails. This was Dan
Dennett's point, IIRC.
No, because the chinese room use only the program of the chinese
man, not necessarily a giant look-up table.
You don't need a huge look-up table (though I think that's how
Searle implicitly described his set-up? ... it's been a long time
since I last read "The Mind's Eye") ... if you have a book that
tells you how to simulate the Chinese man, then that book will also
be huge, and normal intuition will fail. Similarly with the
"Einstein's Brain" book in DRH's fable.
A look-up table containing all counterfactuals would need to be
infinite if it can be Turing universal. But a ginat looku-up table can
be finite and approximate the local live of a finite machine for a
finite time, but then it is a program (in a poor programming language)
and the error of Searle will consist in the confusion of level: the
thinking guy is the one doing the imitation, it is in the one being
imitated.
I can discuss with Einstein by imitating by hands its neurons an glial
cells, but this does not mean I will agree with what *he* will told
me. Consciousness is associated to the abstract relevant level.
Bruno
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