On 5/8/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 May 2015, at 00:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/6/2015 10:32 AM, John Clark wrote:
You said the dovetailer "leads to an irreduciable indeterminism", but if the machine
is finite then a faster but still finite computer could predict what the dovetailer
will do; it still could not of course predict what "you" will see nex
Even worse it cannot predict even the probabilities that a given states of
consciousness (or the universe as a whole) is followed by some other state, because the
UD would have to reach a point from which it would not revisit the given state again
and change the statistics of the successor states. But this is never the case for the
non-terminating programs. Every state may be visited infinitely many times as the UD
runs and so the statistics are always subject to change.
Not at all. By the first person invariance for the delays, the statistics are defined at
the limit.
But that sounds like another instance of reversing the argument: There must be stable
statistics in the limit because my theory is true and if there weren't stable statistics
it wouldn't work.
Brent
Of course one may say there must be a class of states that are statistically stable and
there must be a finite measure for them - but only if the theory is true.
Which is the point.
Bruno
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