On 10 May 2015, at 00:41, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 08:30:47PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

For the recording, its largeness is irrelevant. It is just not a
computing device.


No the recording is the program.

How could you write it in LISP? Or in Fortran?

It does not make sense to me to say that a recording is a program, unless you use it to reinstanciate the boolean graph.



The computing device is the recording
player.

I see only an analogical machine "computing" some elementary projections, trying to do some effort of imagination. It does not compute anything in a sense relevent to say that it enacted consciousness.




True it is not a universal computer, only a special purpose
one. Is universal computation necessary for consciousness though?

technically, no. Subcreativity is enough, but this is a very technical, and usually I demand universality (since salvia, before I demanded Löbianity, which is stronger). It is in any way much more complex than a sequence of arbitrary projection, as the relation involves the counterfactuals, which gives sense to computations.

If there is a little hole in the movie, it is locally counterfactually correct, so consciousness remains, but what if the whole is bigger? And when consciousness would disappear? It has to disappear, even just with physical supervenience, but then we are back to fading qualia.

Bruno




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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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