On 12 May 2015, at 09:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 May 2015, at 09:14, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hmm... On the contrary: the brain is necessary. It is the
primitive physicalness of the brain which is not relevant.
That is not what you say in the paper. "Hence, consciousness is
not a physical phenomenon, nor can it be a phenomenon relating to
observed matter at all."
That is in the context of keeping physical supervenience, to go
toward the absurdity.
The brain is necessary, like all universal and non universal
numbers in the relevant relations.
It is just hat the "physical brains" are the result of the FPI on
an infinity of computations.
As I said to Brent, if consciousness supervenes on physical brains,
and all the evidence says that it does, and consciousness is to come
from the dovetailer states, then so do all the physical laws that
describe the operation of the physical brain -- not from some
different set of dovetailer states,
The infinity of equivalent state (which can be different below the
substitution level).
but from the *same* states.
So: equivalent (from my first person points of view).
And if these laws are to be consistent across the whole observable
universe for all observable time, then all of these, and all other
existing and previously existing consciousnesses, must come from
*exactly the same* set of dovetailer states. You can't pick subsets
of states to give one bit and other subsets to give different bits
because you could not in this way ensure consistency.
OK. No problem with this.
Only one state is then needed, or at most a set of states of zero
measure in the sum. All other states would not be consistent with
what is observed. The FPI of quantum MWI is also a deterministic
result -- Everettian QM follows from a deterministic physical law,
so it must come from consistent states -- not just a random
assortment.
Given this, the MGA appears to be irrelevant to the main argument,
whether the MGA is valid or not becomes unimportant. It does not
support the idea that primitive matter can be ruled out. It cannot
support the idea that physical supervenience is false, since we know
that it is not. So what does the MGA accomplish?
I reduce the mind-body problem to the problem of explaining the
belief by machine in bodies, using as theory of mind
computationalism + computer science.
You go on to say that the appearance of matter cannot be based on
a notion of primitive matter.
Yes. When assuming comp, with comp in the sense of Church-Turing.
(Not in the sense of some notion of physical computation, which I
consider as a physical implementation of a computation)
But primitive matter, and the concept of such, does not appear in
the argument, so you have not eliminated the possibility of
primitive matter.
Primitive matter is supposed by the one want who does the
ultrafinistic-physicalist move to avpoid the physics:arithmetic
reversal of the step 7.
The MGA makes not just primitive matter into a problem, but
physicalism too.
I recall that "primitive" here means only: "as to be assumed", or
"cannot be derived from other assumption".
Not that physics necessarily believes in primitive matter, either.
Physicists usually assumes a stance of scientific realism, which is
just the assumption that the nature and laws of the external world,
whatever they are, are independent of us. The purpose of science is
then to explore the observed world and elucidate the laws that
govern the behaviour we observe. The, as Brent often says, the
fundamental ontology is theory dependent; it is liable to change as
we replace theories by more successful ones. Few people assume that
'matter', in some undefined sense, is the primitive 'ur-stuff' of
the universe.
Indeed, and few physicists have a problem with UDA, nor logicians.
Only physicalists, materialist, naturalist, etc.
Comp does not suggest to change anything in physics. Indeed, the point
is that we can use physics to test computationalism.
The work is really a work in theology, and it shows that Aristotle
theology, with primary matter and its naturalistic metaphysics does no
more work, and that we are led to a theology of the type of Playo,
where the physical reality arise from something else (a point made,
from physical reason by Wheeler, but I extract it more constructively,
from comp and cognitive fundamental science.
Physics does not change, but metaphysics change, and physics is no
more the fundamental science, as it is a consequence of machine's
theology, itself branch of computer science, itself branch of
arithmetic.
We get a scheme of TOEs. Any first order specification of a (Church-
Turing) universal system will do, and physics is shown machine
"theory" independent. AUDA, the mathematical translation of UDA, shows
how this can work (and actually does work). So we get an explanation
of where the laws of physics come from, and (in the math part) why it
splits into communicable 3p and non communicable but undoubtable 1p.
Bruno
Bruce
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