On 13 May 2015, at 15:22, David Nyman wrote:
On 13 May 2015 at 12:19, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
The fact that coffee can change my mind, and that my mind can change
my brain is part of evidence for comp, not for the primitive
physical supervenience thesis, whose main weakness at the start is
that it assumes physicalism, primary matter, which are metaphysical
concept, and no real scientific evidences have ever been given to
them. It is a strong assumption in theology. There are no evidence
that there is a *primitive* physical universe, or that some laws of
physics has to be assumed.
So IIUC, in your terminology, 'primitive physicalism' just stands
for the assumption that some definite 'laws of physics' are assumed
to be more basic than anything else. If so, on that assumption, such
laws would of necessity be the ultimate basis of any effective
computation (i.e. in some physical approximation). The MGA then
points out that in principle we can always devise ways to preserve
the purely physical dispositions of any given approximate
realisation (by fortuitous or deliberate one-time interventions)
even in circumstances where any or all of its original computational
characteristics have been grossly disrupted.
MGA then argues that, if conscious experience fundamentally depends
on preservation of such physical dispositions, we should thereby
conclude that it should be unaffected in such scenarios. But the
problem is that the interventions cannot be guaranteed to preserve
the original 'computational' architecture (in particular, its
counter-factual capabilities). Hence it would seem that, on the one
hand, that if consciousness supervenes on particular physical
dispositions of the brain it should be preserved, but on the other,
if it depends on the particular *computational* characteristics of
such dispositions, it could not be (since these can always be
disrupted or simplified). It is the incompatibility of these two
views that forces a choice between the principles of physical and
computational supervenience.
It is argued in opposition to the rejection of physical
supervenience that it appears everywhere to be supported by
observation. However, if two observed phenomena (e.g. brain function
and conscious experience) are found to be in constant conjunction,
an alternative to one or the other having a 'primary' role would be
that they both emanate from some common underlying progenitor. Under
computationalism, that role is subsumed by the entire spectrum of
computations below the substitution level of either (i.e. the
'computational everything').
Is that more or less your view?
I think it is a good summary, yes. Thanks!
Bruno
David
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