On 13 May 2015 at 14:53, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: I think it is a good summary, yes. Thanks! >
Building on that then, would you say that bodies and brains (including of course our own) fall within the class of embedded features of the machine's generalised 'physical environment'? Their particular role being the relation between the 'knower' in platonia and the environment in general. At a 'low' level, the comp assumption is that the FPI results in a 'measure battle' yielding a range of observable transformations (or continuations) consistent with the Born probabilities (else comp is false). A physics consistent with QM, in other words. But the expectation is also that the knower itself maintains its capacity for physical manifestation in relation to the transformed environment, in each continuation, in order for the observations to occur. BTW, Bruce made the point that the expected measure of the class of such physically-consistent observations, against the background of UD*, must be very close to zero. ISTM that this isn't really the point (e.g. the expected measure of readable books in the Library of Babel must also be close to zero). What seems more relevant is the presumed lack of 'un-physical' observer -environment relations (i.e. not only 'why no white rabbits?' but 'why physics?'). From this perspective, the obvious difference between the Library of Babel and UD* is that the former must be 'observed' externally whereas the latter is conceived as yielding a view 'from within'. Hence what must be justified is why our particular species of internal observer - i.e. the kind capable of self-manifesting within consistently 'physical' environments, should predominate. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
