On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis
(also known as the strong AI thesis, I think)
Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but that
position is proved to be nonsense.
Comp is just "I am a digitalizable machine".
String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It
does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does not
need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses might be
able to think too.
But in saying "I am a digitalizable machine" you implicitly assume
that machine exists in the environment that you exist in.
That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of
environments, played by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence
are relative, and phenomenological.
It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that
provides meaning to the "digital thoughts" of the machine.
I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning? The point
is that your generalized brain, as long as it is digital, cannot
singularize your soul. If you don't add non Turing emulable magic in
matter, the argument shows that matter has to arise from a statistics
on all computations going through the current state. If not, could you
say precisely when the proof go wrong?
Bruno
Brent
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