On 6/10/2015 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as
the strong AI thesis, I think)
Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but that position is
proved to be nonsense.
Comp is just "I am a digitalizable machine".
String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically
entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities.
Gods and goddesses might be able to think too.
But in saying "I am a digitalizable machine" you implicitly assume that machine
exists in the environment that you exist in.
That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of environments,
played by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence are relative, and
phenomenological.
It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that provides meaning
to the "digital thoughts" of the machine.
I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning?
It undermines the MGA because it shows that whether a physical process instantiates a
computation is a wholistic question, one whose answer is relative to the environment
and interaction with that environment. This means that isolating the movie graph and
then showing that it is absurd to regard it as a computation is not a legitimate move.
The boolean graph contained the part of the simulation of the environment.
That doesn't solve the problem. The simulation of the environment refers to the
environment outside the simulation (that's why it's a /simulation/). So if someone asks
how the computation gets meaning the answer is contagious and extends indefinitely far in
time and space.
Then the movie graph does not emulate a computation, and that is what lead to the
absurdity.
Or you mean that the environment needs primitive matter, but then the boolean graph
already does not the relevant computation.
I'm confused on that point. Comp1 is the proposition that the brain can be replaced by a
digital computer at some level of emulation. The brain's function must be Turing
emulable. But then after going through the argument to show that conscious thoughts, as
computations, exist independent of material processes, you somehow jump to the conclusion
that neither conscious thoughts nor physical processes are Turing emulable (which is why I
called those conclusions part of "comp2").
Brent
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