On 09 Jun 2015, at 00:21, LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We
know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations
can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations
can be conscious, nor does it mean that brains are computations.
These two latter statements might be true, but they are not
necessarily true, even given computationalism.
I may not have phrased it very well, but comp1 is the assumption
that consciousness is based on computation, and can't be created by
anything else (at least that's comp1 in a simple form - actually, I
believe it's the assumption that at some level physics is Turing
emulable).
At some level, the physics *required* for my consciousness will be.
But comp predicts that physics is not Turing emulable. Physics is
given by the FPI on the computations, and that is not computable (like
the question: will i find up or down when looking at this
superposition is also non computable).
On that basis, a brain must do computation (at some level), since
it's conscious, and an AI could be conscious given the correct
programme.
Yes, and more importantly, a recording is not conscious, as, if it is,
you can no more say yes to a doctor for computation reason. If a
recording can be conscious, why not a physical neuron? In thjat cse
comp is false. We say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio* (if not
comp became spurious: we could say yes because we believe in the
Virgin Mary power to resurrect us).
Bruno
(And what's wrong with "sneaked" ?)
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