On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2015 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist
hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think)
Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but
that position is proved to be nonsense.
Comp is just "I am a digitalizable machine".
String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious).
It does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does
not need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses
might be able to think too.
But in saying "I am a digitalizable machine" you implicitly
assume that machine exists in the environment that you exist in.
That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities
of environments, played by UMs (with and without oracles). Such
existence are relative, and phenomenological.
It is this environment and your potential interaction with it
that provides meaning to the "digital thoughts" of the machine.
I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning?
It undermines the MGA because it shows that whether a physical
process instantiates a computation is a wholistic question, one
whose answer is relative to the environment and interaction with
that environment. This means that isolating the movie graph and
then showing that it is absurd to regard it as a computation is
not a legitimate move.
The boolean graph contained the part of the simulation of the
environment.
That doesn't solve the problem. The simulation of the environment
refers to the environment outside the simulation (that's why it's a
simulation). So if someone asks how the computation gets meaning
the answer is contagious and extends indefinitely far in time and
space.
Why. All those environment/brain situations are emulated infinitely
often in arithmetic.
or you are placing something magical in the environment, or in the use
of therm "meaning".
Then the movie graph does not emulate a computation, and that is
what lead to the absurdity.
Or you mean that the environment needs primitive matter, but then
the boolean graph already does not the relevant computation.
I'm confused on that point.
I agree it is subtle. I am confused too on this, but the contrary
would be astonishing. Consciousness and theology, in the comp frame is
easy (as John K said), but not that easy.
Comp1 is the proposition that the brain can be replaced by a digital
computer at some level of emulation.
OK. It can be replaced, in the physical reality, at the substitution
level.
The brain's function must be Turing emulable.
At least those relevant for the relevant computations. OK.
But then after going through the argument to show that conscious
thoughts, as computations,
Careful, you might associate consciousness to cpmputation, but
actually, consciousness, like knowledge is associated to computations,
but also to God (Truth).
exist independent of material processes, you somehow jump to the
conclusion that neither conscious thoughts nor physical processes
are Turing emulable (which is why I called those conclusions part of
"comp2").
This is because you are indetermined below your substitution level,
and matter stabilizes on the FPI on a*all* computation. And
consciousness is related to Truth, which is not even definable. I
might say more later, if when going again through the step 7. It is
not simple, and highly counter-intuitive, but it is important that
people understand better the fact that arithmetic emulates the
computations, beyond describing them. I have realized lately that this
is not obvious for more than one people on this list.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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