On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 12:43 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > >>>> > >>>> >> >>>> >>>> You need to stay with the referent of the word "I" >>> >>> >>> >> >>> I agree, so when describing the latest variation on the thought >>> experiment why not simply do away with personal pronouns like "I" and use >>> the referent instead? >>> >> >> > >> Because that's impossible. >> > > I agree, in talking about the future in a world with duplicating machines > it's impossible to express Bruno's ideas without using "I", a personal > pronoun that in this context has no referent, in other words a personal > pronoun that means absolutely positively nothing, zero, zilch, nada, goose > egg. I > n other words bruno's ideas are not wrong, they're gibberish. > > > Whether post-duplication-machine or post-many-worlds-duplication, "I" refers to the person having a subjective experience. Post duplication, we both agree that the persons diverge in either scenario. So there are two first-person experiences, but we can refer to *THE* first-person experience of either person: i.e., what it's like to be Moscow Man or Washington Man. What it's like to see the dead cat or the live cat. "I" see a dead cat. "I" see that I am in Washington. > > >> There is something it is like to go through a duplicator, and what it's >> like to be duplicated in a duplicator vs a many-worlds thought experiment >> is going to be the same because computationally speaking, those scenarios >> are equivalent. >> > > You keep saying that but give no reasons to think they are equivalent, I > keep saying they are not equivalent but unlike you I give very detailed > reasons why they are not equivalent. > > If you disagree with my reasons then tell me why, but don't just keep > saying they're equivalent. > The reasons you are giving why they are not equivalent only bear on the third-person perspective: the description of the bodies, and how we can refer to them. The reasons I am giving why they are equivalent bear on the first-person perspective: the conscious experience of the person going through the many-worlds or single-world duplication. I have been pretty clear on why they are equivalent... consciousness supervenes on physical brains (assuming computationalism), the physical brains are duplicated in both scenarios, and they diverge post-duplication (eventually, if you insist). >From *THE* first-person perspective of either duplicated person, those scenarios are equivalent. Since first-person is what is relevant to Step 3, my explanation of why they are equivalent is what matters, not your third-person explanation of why they are not. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
