Here's the link: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ
Jason On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 8:07 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > I believe John Clark is trolling everyone. He understands and believes in > FPI brought about by duplication but is feigning incomprehension. > > For proof: Search this group's history for the thread "RE: For John Clark" > and see the post he made on October 31st 2013 in response to a post I made. > > In that post he accepts that fundamental randomness is indistinguishable > from the unpredictability caused by duplication. > > Jason > > On Saturday, July 4, 2015, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 12:24 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> > >> On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >>> > >>> > > >>> when I implore you to respond to my argument (which by the way uses no > personal pronouns) about your position you deliberately remove it from your > response or assume I'm parroting Bruno, or use some other rhetorical trick > that gets you out of answering it. > >> > >> I honestly don't know what you're referring to, I've reread a few of > your most recent posts but I'm still not sure. I must have missed it, > please repeat the question. > >> > >> John K Clark > > > > Let me make my argument as explicit as possible. > > > > You assume computationalism, or the idea that consciousness supervenes > on the physical brain. > > Starting with a Many Worlds thought experiment (such as Schrodinger's > Cat), there is one conscious subject supervening on one conscious brain > prior to the duplication. > > After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which diverge > as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the experiment > > Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two physical > brains. > > You accept the idea that in a Many Worlds experiment like the above, the > subject is duplicated, and prior to the experiment, the subject can > sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be experienced > post-duplication. > > Moving on to a duplication machine experiment, such as the one > postulated in Bruno's step 3, there is one conscious subject supervening on > one conscious brain prior to the duplication (identical to #2 above) > > After the duplication above, there are two physical brains which diverge > as a consequence of observing the different outcomes of the experiment > (identical to #3 above) > > Therefore there are two consciousnesses, supervening on the two physical > brains. (identical to #4 above) > > Therefore, as in #5 above, prior to the experiment the subject can > sensibly assign probabilities to which outcome will be experienced > post-duplication. > > > > There are no personal pronouns in play here, as none are needed. The > only thing that is needed to make Step 3 go through is a conscious > experiencer pre-duplication, and a split into two bodies post-duplication. > It is not important whether anyone observing this experiment can make sense > of the identity of the bodies. > > Terren > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
