On 06 Jul 2015, at 18:30, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> I ask you again. You (or anyone) are in Helsinki, you will be
duplicated, and both copies will get a cup of coffee in W and in M.
The question is asked to you (or to anyone doing that experiment)
in Helsinki, before pushing the button: "what is your personal first
person expectation of drinking a cup of coffee after having push on
the button.
If both get the coffee then "I" would expect to get the coffee
regardless of the precise meaning of the personal pronoun "I" ;
So you agree that P("experience of getting a cup of coffee soon") = 1.
OK?
not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have
anything to do with the sense of continuity of consciousness.
The reasoning use only what it needs to get the conclusion.
Then, later, I can explain that the Theaetetus definition of the
knower, when applied to Gödel''s beweisbar leads to a notion of first
person self provably having no definition in arithmetic, like
arithmetical truth, yet obeying a precise logic, decidable at the
propositional level.
What Jason was 'babbling' about, is that the thesis is mainly the UDA
and its translation in Arithmetic, using the "well known" (since
Gödel) tools of mathematical logic.
Smullyan's "Forever Undecided" is a good introduction to the main
modal logic of self-reference, the modal logic G. Boolos' 1979 is a
good book but it requires a good understanding of basic mathematical
logics (like Mendelson's book).
Don't forget to confirm, or not and then why, that you agree that
P("experience of getting a cup of coffee soon") = 1 in the step 3 +
Coffee protocol.
Bruno
John K Clark
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