On 07 Jul 2015, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:
On 7/6/2015 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 1:33 PM, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected] >> wrote:

   If there's only one consciousness which is aware of both
   Washington and Moscow then asking the body looking at the
   Washington Monument what the Kremlin looks like would elicit an
   accurate answer.  There's no contradiction in information being
   transferred from Moscow to Washington any more than transferring
   it from a toe to a brain.

​ Nobody thinks new physics would be needed to explain how a message moves from your toe to your brain, but new physics would be required to explain how the Washington Man could accurately say what's going on in Moscow without using electronics. ​
​ So I don't think the Washington Man could do that.
I didn't say they could, I said there was no *logical* contradiction in them doing so. In fact it's not even a nomological contradiction because humans could have evolved or manufactured RF communication devices in their brains such that, when duplicated, the two copies continued to shared information. But my point was that in Bruno's UD multiverse there will be universes in which this is the case. So to show that duplication necessarily entails two consciouses, he needs to show that our physics and our evolution are necessary, not contingent.

Bruno appears to believe that the same physics must obtain in all possible universes, only initial conditions can differ.

Please. You oversimpilfy.



Quote:
"Only the geographico-historical features can be brute facts. The whole point is that with comp, physical laws does exist, and are the same for all universal machine, because they are all under the same FPI on the same domain (UD*). Physics, unlike geography is justified."

You see? I say that the physical laws have to be the same for all universal machine. This is neutral on the question of the existence of one, two, three or infinity (enumerable, not eneumarable, ...) of physical universes.





I think Bruno is simply wrong here. For the dovetailer in Platonia (AUDA), every computable universe is included, and these can have arbitrarily different physics. Cf. Tegmark's CUH.

Exercise: refute the CUH. Hint: UDA.

The "physical" is what make your experience, not just existing, but stable and "normal" in some gaussian sense. With comp, we can't exclude other universe so different that we have non counterparts in it. The fact is that "we" are supported by an infinity of computations, and the laws of physics are invariant in the way to manage those infinities. My only fear, when young, was that this would lead to classical logic, from which it would have followed that physics does not exist and is only a form of geography. That would have make comp somehow trivial about physics. But that is not the case, there is a complex physical core shared by all universal beings. Now, it is a complex structure, and depending of its derivation from the intensional nuances, it might have different phase allowing different kind of "physical reality". The picture is just very rich, and unlike physicists, we get the qualia theory extending the quanta. All this from an hypothesis that almost all scientists believe in (even when not really knowing the mathematical theory behind). By testing the quanta part, we can refute or confirm indirectly the qualia part.

Bruno



Bruce

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