On 08 Jul 2015, at 03:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote
On 07 Jul 2015, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 7/6/2015 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 1:33 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
>> wrote:
If there's only one consciousness which is aware of both
Washington and Moscow then asking the body looking at the
Washington Monument what the Kremlin looks like would elicit an
accurate answer. There's no contradiction in information being
transferred from Moscow to Washington any more than transferring
it from a toe to a brain.
Nobody thinks new physics would be needed to explain how a
message moves from your toe to your brain, but new physics would
be required to explain how the Washington Man could accurately
say what's going on in Moscow without using electronics.
So I don't think the Washington Man could do that.
I didn't say they could, I said there was no *logical*
contradiction in them doing so. In fact it's not even a
nomological contradiction because humans could have evolved or
manufactured RF communication devices in their brains such that,
when duplicated, the two copies continued to shared information.
But my point was that in Bruno's UD multiverse there will be
universes in which this is the case. So to show that duplication
necessarily entails two consciouses, he needs to show that our
physics and our evolution are necessary, not contingent.
Bruno appears to believe that the same physics must obtain in all
possible universes, only initial conditions can differ.
Please. You oversimpilfy.
Not at all -- I simply report what you have said.
Wrongly as your quote confirms.
Quote:
"Only the geographico-historical features can be brute facts. The
whole point is that with comp, physical laws does exist, and are
the same for all universal machine, because they are all under the
same FPI on the same domain (UD*). Physics, unlike geography is
justified."
You see? I say that the physical laws have to be the same for all
universal machine. This is neutral on the question of the existence
of one, two, three or infinity (enumerable, not eneumarable, ...)
of physical universes.
The number of universe is irrelevant, and not what I said. Your
claim, repeated here, is that the physical laws are the same for all
existing universes.
No. I say that the physical laws are the same for all universal
machines. They are the observers, and I can prove, even in RA, their
existence, unlike "universe" which might just not exist, and even if
they exist in some secondary sense, it is only in the mind of
universal numbers.
I think Bruno is simply wrong here. For the dovetailer in Platonia
(AUDA), every computable universe is included, and these can have
arbitrarily different physics. Cf. Tegmark's CUH.
Exercise: refute the CUH. Hint: UDA.
Exercise: prove yo youself that the dovetailer running in Platonia
(arithmetic) completely implements Tegmark's CUH.
Proof: Trivially true, since the UD runs all possible programs, it
must run the programs instatiating every computable universe.
But "you" are simultaneously in all of them. Only the change above
your substitution level can make your consciousness differentiating,
and so being in a stable, normal universe, is determined by the
statistics on all computable "universe", and that has to be unique, as
that is determined globally by all universal numbers/computations.
Here you use an identity mind-brain which is simply false once we
accept computationalism.
The "physical" is what make your experience, not just existing, but
stable and "normal" in some gaussian sense. With comp, we can't
exclude other universe so different that we have non counterparts
in it.
See, you say it again. All possible universes are instantiated, even
those that do not support intelligent (conscious) life.
The physical is what assure the existence of a measure one. It depends
on all computation. You cannot attach your mind to one computable
universe, you needs them all, and "all universal machines" is the same
for all machines.
You have not yet understood or mediate enough on the step seven.
The fact is that "we" are supported by an infinity of computations,
and the laws of physics are invariant in the way to manage those
infinities.
This makes no sense. We need only the computations that constitute
each individual universe.
You forget the FPI. If you were true, there would be no Boltzmann
Brain problem, even in infinite robust physical universes.
Repetitions are merely the same universe again -- identity of
indiscernibles.
But they can differentiate. All the human universe are equal only if
your substitution level is infinitely low, or that your only brain is
the whole physical reality.
My only fear, when young, was that this would lead to classical
logic, from which it would have followed that physics does not
exist and is only a form of geography. That would have make comp
somehow trivial about physics. But that is not the case, there is a
complex physical core shared by all universal beings. Now, it is a
complex structure, and depending of its derivation from the
intensional nuances, it might have different phase allowing
different kind of "physical reality". The picture is just very
rich, and unlike physicists, we get the qualia theory extending the
quanta. All this from an hypothesis that almost all scientists
believe in (even when not really knowing the mathematical theory
behind).
By testing the quanta part, we can refute or confirm indirectly the
qualia part.
This reduces to an argument that consciousness is essential for
physical existence.
Indeed. We have NUMBERS ==> DREAMS ==> "PHYSICAL UNIVERSE PHENOMENOLOGY"
That is manifest nonsense. The universe we inhabit existed for
billions of years before any intelligent or conscious life evolved.
You make consciousness into some ineffable magic that brings
physical universes into being. What utter nonsense.
I use less magic than you. I assume only computationalism, classical
logic +
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
In that theory, I define the universal machines/numbers, including the
Löbian one which believe also in the induction axioms, and which obey
to the logic G and G*, and that is used to explain why the self-
referentially correct machine (the Löbian machine) have the experience
of seeing a universe, when there is none at the basic ontologic level.
Note that no universe is brought into being. They only *appears* to
exist in long (deep) computations winning the measure on all possible
computations going through my (indexical) current computational state.
I think that you are not really trying to understand what happens when
we assume computationalism. It looks like you do understand the FPI,
but stop to apply it at step seven.
Bruno
Bruce
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