On 03 Sep 2015, at 02:31, chris peck wrote:
Bruno
>> And someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect
to live. JC remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed
that you will survive, so you expect to live some experience, no?
Let me ask you this how to you evaluate the chance to see 0 on the
paper after opening the drawer.
'You' is ambiguous *because* we agree that 'you' will survive. If we
agreed 'you' wouldn't survive then its meaning is clear. 'You'
denotes just JC at Helsinki.
>> Surely, you can't be serious, as this is not a first experience.
It is a list of first person experiences. "
Don't call me Shirley, and 'I will see 0 or I will see 1' is a list
just as really as 'I will see 0 and I will see 1'. Whats your point?
"I will see 0 or I will see 1" *remains a true prediction for all
continuations.
"I will see 0 and I will see 1" is 1-false for all continuations,
althoughtrivially 3-1 true, but the question was about the next life
experience, not a third person description of them.
>> After pushing the button, you will live only one realization of
the experience just listed above.
This explicitly violates the agreement that 'you' survives in both
rooms when duplicated.
I usually agree on this, but John Clark is used to make sense of it,
and it is indeed what yoy get in the third person description talking
about that"I" in the third person way. I void doing this, and do it
only because John C makes that move. It is unecessary.
Also, its when you phrase things this way that it becomes clear that
you are violating 'comp' because it is equivolent to saying that
'you' survives in only one branch, that despite the copy being made
at the right substitution level in both rooms, something else is
carrying over to one or the other room that is not contained in the
description. You're language makes it clear that you believe,
implicitly if not explicitly, that the description is incomplete.
The whole magic comes from the fact that the level is right, and the
evolution is 3p deterministic, but then this why the 1p evolution is
not deterministic. The 0 v 1 is a necessarily non constructive OR.
There is no problem once you distinguish well if the question bear on
the subjective experience, or on objective 3p communicable predicate.
>> you really maintain that the result of JC opening the drawer will
be "0 and 1"?
yes in the following sense. I survive in both rooms. In both rooms I
open the drawer. So I will 'live' the experience of 0 and I will
'live' the experience of 1.
That is a 3p description of what you will live. But no continuations
will live that from their 1p view. They will live only the experience
of 0, or the experience of 1. Not both, as they are exclusive (John
agrees that they are exclsuive).
>> So JC predicts "0 and 1". Then I interview JC-0. Did you observe
"0 and 1". Yes, JC told me.
How come? JC -1 has not yet been reconstituted, may be ...
Perhaps the question that needs to be asked of JC-H is whether he
can expect to see 0 and 1 at precisely the same moment? Is that the
question you are trying to formulate?
That is made explicit at step 4. in Step 3 the question is
operational: you *will* push on the button, and open a drawer. What do
you expect to live as experience. the comp answer is that I expect to
see a 0, or a 1, and I don't expect to see a blurred combination of 0
or 1. After the experience, both JC-0 and JC-1 will confirm that this
is indeed verified.
Also, you have to be clear about how 'you' operates. It can track
'you' backwards in time from JC-0 to JC-H and from JC-1 to JC-H, but
it doesn't work well tracking duplicates across space at a
particular time. So JC-0 can't track to JC-1. So, for example whilst
it is true that JC-0-'you' is not JC-1-'you', both are JC-H-'you'.
No problem.
In otherwords, because JC-0 and JC-1's experiences are exclusive
relative to one another, they are not exclusive relative to JC-H.
Right.
We have discuss this already. It means that personal identity is an
intensional notion, or a modal notion, in which the Leibniz identity
principle (a = b and a = c ->. b = c) is not valid. No problem, this
is illustrated also in the math part, and indeed it explains why we
can't avoid modal logic. But this does not refute the FPI, if that is
what you were trying to do.
Bruno
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 19:40:16 +0200
On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>Bruno Marchal was alluding on how you predict your
subjective experience when you do an experience in physics
where "you" has been duplicated and thus making that personal
pronoun ambiguous.
>I have repeated many times that the question is always asked
before the duplication.
And the question is about what one and only one thing will happen
to YOU after YOU has been duplicated and becomes TWO. In other
words the question was about gibberish.
I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I
can't prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has
been able to do any better.
> If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the
matter.
If we're dealing in philosophy and not everyday conversation and
it my body is a machine then I don't know what "choice" means.
And if my body is not a machine I still don't know what "choice"
means.
> You beg the question with respect to step 3.
There may be a question mark but there is no question. And I have
no answer because gibberish has no answer.
>> When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know.
> Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument that
there is no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument
that a simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you
don't believe in.
A computer can make a simulated hurricane but because it uses only
numbers to build the storm and numbers (probably) have no
physical properties the simulated hurricane would always lack
something the real hurricane had, the physical ability to get the
computer wet.
However if it turned out that you're right and math is more
fundamental than physics and numbers have everything physics has and
more then a clever enough programmer could write a program that
would cause the computer to actually get wet. I'm very skeptical
that such a program is possible but I can't prove it's impossible so
maybe you're right.
>> No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody
has ever made one single calculation without the use of physical
hardware
> How do you know that?
Because every time a calculation is made something physical
in a computer changes and if I change something physical in a
computer the calculation changes.
> How do you know that there is physical hardware?
Because I can touch the hardware with my physical hand.
> If you don't know if math is or not the fundamental science,
Observations can be made regardless of it math or physics is the
fundamental science.
> But we know as a fact that elementary arithmetic (Robinson
Arithmetic) contains all terminating computations, and all pieces on
the non terminating computations.
Then computer chips would be unnecessary and Raphael M Robinson
should be the principle stockholder of the Robinson computer
corporation and be a trillionare, but I don't believe that is the
case.
A physical brain or a physical computer can perform calculations
that produce Robinson arithmetic, it can describe how a
calculation was done, but Robinson
arithmetic can't actuality calculate a damn thing. .
>> why hasn't at least one of those numerous scientists started
their own computer hardware company with zero manufacturing costs
and become a trillionaire? This is not a rhetorical question, I'd
really like an answer.
> For the same reason that nobody would drink simulated water,
unless they are simulated themselves.
That is a very bad analogy because there is such a thing as
simulated water but there is no such thing as simulated arithmetic;
simulated water is different from physical water but arithmetic is
always just arithmetic. I think we would both agree that when a
simulated computer calculates 2+2 the 4 it produces is exactly the
same as the 4 a non-simulated computer would make when
doing the same calculation, and the same would be true if the
simulated computer itself simulated a computer. But we also
agree that simulated water would not quench your thirst the way that
physical water would, so if physical water has attributes that
numbers can not produce, so you tell me if physics or
mathematics is the more fundamental.
>>>> Convince the National Academy of Science or the
Royal Society that you're not talking nonsense and have them make
you a member; and then convince the International Congress of
Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields Metal and announce
it all here.
>>> You are basically making an argument by authority
here,
>>> And your multiple statements that I have not convinced
anybody else on this list is not an argument from authority??
>No, it is not. It is a simple observation that anybody can
verify.
And it is a simple observation that anybody can verify that you
have been unable to convince the National Academy of Science or
the Royal Society or me.
Oh! Give me the address and I will think about it.
Frankly, I thought that doing a PhD in a recognized university is
enough.
I think you are the only one thinking this deserves the Nobel prize,
thanks!
Your post above is slightly better than usual, you are just
anticipating points which are decomposed in the next step of the
Universal Dovetailer Argument notably step 6, 7, and 8.
Just one remark: we cannot make a piece of matter wet in arithmetic,
but once we postulate computationalism, we can prove that all the
piece of computations leading to the first person experience of
feeling wet, or clenching your thirst, exist in arithmetic, indeed,
in a super-redundant way, that play a rôle in the measure problem.
And now a desert. The little tale of JC the FPI-skeptic guy.
I will please you and not use pronouns (despite having refute any
problem with the use).
So JC was in Helsinki, where he was proposed an experience of being
scanned (at the right level), annihilated, and copied in the rooms 0
and 1. Which are similar except for a paper in a drawer where 0 and
1 is written on it. (To change a bit). Note that both remains in
Helsinki, as the rooms here are in Helsinki too.
And someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect to
live. JC remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed that
you will survive, so you expect to live some experience, no? Let me
ask you this how to you evaluate the chance to see 0 on the paper
after opening the drawer.
JC said, BULLSHIT! JC said that JC will predict to see both 0 and 1.
Oh? that is your prediction?
"- yes, I predict that I will see only 0 and that I will see only 1"
"Surely, you can't be serious, as this is not a first experience. It
is a list of first person experiences. After pushing the button, you
will live only one realization of the experience just listed above.
Do you really maintain that the result of JC opening the drawer will
be "0 and 1"? If that is the case, let us do the experience, as we
have the mans to verify, when using the definition given of first
person experience (the memory trail, as described in the personal
diary of the self-duplication.
So JC predicts "0 and 1". Then I interview JC-0. Did you observe "0
and 1". Yes, JC told me.
How come? JC -1 has not yet been reconstituted, may be ... Of
course, here we are confronted to the gigantic ocean of bad faith of
JC.
Oops, I will have to resume correction of math exams, then get the
amount of sleep to make me able to correct even more exams.
Are we living for working?
or are we working for living?
I smell rampant confusions there too I'm afraid.
Bruno
John K Clark
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