On 10 Sep 2015, at 20:55, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> I will answer your next post if it contains something new.
Then I guess it contained something new.
>>> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all
computations can be emulated
>> Bullshit.
> No, it is a theorem in computer science.
Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips
do.
Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of turing
universality by physical devices.
But number relations implement computations, in the sense of Turing.
> computations, emulation are used in the original mathematical
sense of Turing.
Turing reduced a computer
A human computer, yes;
to it's essentials so we can understand how they work, no computer
is simpler than a Turing Machine, but even a Turing Machine needs
a tape made of matter and a read head that be changed by the
physical tape and a write head that can make chances to that
physical tape.
Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico-mathematical
sense of existence?
If yes, you are using some non-standard definition different from the
people working in the field.
If no, just notice that the computations in the sense of Turing exists
in a sense similar to the existence of prime numbers.
> Those are arithmetical notion.
Arithmetical notions don't make calculations, physical
microprocessor chips do.
Arithmetical relations does implement computations. Indeed all
universal system do that, and we know today that Robinson arithmetic
is Turing universal.
> The notion of physical computation is a different notion,
Yes they are different, lots of people have made physical
computations but NOBODY has ever made a non-physical computation
Because BODY are physical. But a person can do a computation too, and
they are not necessarily physical, and then number relations are not
physical, and they can implement computations.
and there is zero evidence anybody ever could, although I can't
prove nobody ever will.
You might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen, which
explains this with some details. The book of Matiyasevich shiws in all
details how Dipohantine polynomials can simulate an arbitrary
universal Turing machine.
>>There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer
hardware, but there are no levels in computations!
> What? This is just wrong. In arithmetic you do have a
simulation of a fortran program elumating an algol program emulating
a quantum computer emulating the game of life emulating ... There
are arbitrary long chain of such simulation,
And at the end of that long chain the answer you get when 2 is
added to 2 is still 4, the exact same 4 you'd get if it was just
calculated in your head; it's not a simulated 4 it's just 4 and it
has all the properties of any other 4. But simulated water does NOT
have all the properties of physical water and I'm still waiting for
you to explain why not if arithmetic really is more fundamental than
matter as you claim.
That is the whole point of the UDA. Physical water, like any physical
stuff does not rely on one computations, but on an infinity of them,
due to the First Person Indeterminacy. Once we look at ourselve or at
our environment at a level below the substitution level, we find the
*apparent* primary matter, which ca only emerge from those infinities,
and a priori that is not emulable by a specific computer, although it
has to be approximable, or we would not exist.
> I have given the definition already, reread them, or buy a
book in computer science.
Definitions don't make calculations and neither do books
, physical microprocessor chips do.
Definition does not but relation does. Indeed a computation is a
digital relation, and it does not depends on any physical assumption.
Just read a book in theoretical computer science.
>> Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet?
> Because you can't create primitive matter,
A good answer or at least I can't think of a better one. If it's
true then primitive matter must be more fundamental than arithmetic
because it has something that numbers don't and can do things that
numbers can't.
Numbers can share relations, and if we assume computationalism,
numbers can share relations which implement any computation. So if
computationalism is correct, the existence of the computation in your
current brain which allows you to read this post is implemented an
infinity of times through an infinity of number relations which exists
in the same sense that the relation x < y exists. Then from your first
person perspective you cannot distinguish, without doing experiments,
if you are emulated in a block material universe (if that could exist)
or in the block mindscape constituted by the (Sigma_1) arithmetical
reality.
> But Arithmetic can simulate water making wet a computer.
Yes, but a computer can't simulate all wet computers, it can't
create a wet computer made of real physical matter. OK now I'm going
to do something I shouldn't and argue against what I just said.
A simulated-simulated computer could go up a level and make a
simulated computer wet, after all neither involve physics (except
that both are running programs on the same physical computer). Some
might say that what looks like hardware to somebody on one level
would look like software to somebody on a higher level, but I don't
think things are quite as clear cut as that; a conscious simulated
computer might create and start up a simulated-simulated computer
but it can't know what that simulated-simulated computer will come
up with anymore than we can know what our programs will end up doing.
That depends of which computation you emulate.
So the simulated computer and the simulated-simulated computer
influence each other and there is no strict top to bottom ordering
as far as cause and effect is concerned. And yet no computer program
running on a real physical computer can make that real physical
computer wet.
True. But non relevant for the point I am making. Note that what you
say is even provable when we assume computationalism, as comp explain
the existence of primary matter, without assuming it, and it proves
that a priori that primary matter is not emulable: as it result from
the non-computable set of of all relevant continuations here-and-now.
But maybe I'm wrong about that, a program could make a physical
computer wet if it were running on the right hardware, say a
computer with water balloons inside set to burst if the simulated
computer performed action X. Some would say that would be cheating
That would no more be a computation in Turing sense.
and it would be UNLESS our entire universe is a computer simulation,
then to somebody in that level of higher reality than our
own both the physical microprocessor and the physical water balloons
would just be lines of program code. Of course the guy at that
higher level would be pondering the same math vs physics question
that we are and wondering if he wasn't a simulation too at an even
higher level of reality.
You keep saying you don't believe in fundamental primitive matter
I have never said anything like that. I keep my belief to myself. I
just assume computationalism and then make mathematical deduction.
but the only way you could be right about that is if there is a
infinite (and not just astronomical) number of levels above
I would use "below" but OK.
our own level each simulating the one below; because if there are
only a finite number then the one at the very top would have to play
by different rules and just accept the existence of matter as a
brute fact that numbers can never explain or reproduce.
On the contrary, numbers cannot avoid it for logical reason, and thus
can predict it, and verify it. They cannot simulate it, but they can
explain why it has to appear to them. And the explanation is testable.
In particular the logic of []p & <>t must have a quantization, and
eventually that has been confirmed.
>> if arithmetic really is more fundamental than physics I have
grave difficulties in understanding why that arithmetic produced
water should be lacking any attribute the physical water has, like
the ability to quench my thirst.
> It does not, except if you assume the existence of some
primitive water,
I don't assume anything but I do know 4 things for certain:
1) Simulated water can not quench my thirst.
That is ambiguous. Once I was very thirsty, and lost in a dry place. I
fell asleep and dreamed that I drink water and that gave me for a time
the feeling that water was quenching my thirst. In that sense,
simulated water can quench my thirst, of course not at the physical
level, but this is already explain by comp, so no need to add a
metaphysically existing primary matter, especially that at step 8 we
see that it cannot plays any role related to any conscious experience
(but I know you are not that far).
2) Physical water can quench my thirst.
3) You can not explain facts 1 and 2 if numbers are more fundamental
than physics unless there are an infinite number of simulated
realities above us.
But it is a theorem that there is an infinity of level of simulation
in arithmetic.
4) A simpler explanation is we don't live in a computer simulation
and physics is more fundamental than arithmetic.
But this cannot work. But you need to grasp step 3 before I can
explain more on this.
>> why don't you just emulate that hardware in arithmetic?
> That is not enough,
That is what I suspect too, the laws of arithmetic
just aren't good enough to make matter because they're lacking
something and that is the laws of physics.
Of course, but incompleteness, which is a theorem for all Löbian
number, can already explain why numbers relations in general are *mucH
more rich and complex than what the numbers can explain. Löbian
machine (relative numbers) are completely aware of those limitations.
It is the "miracle" of the universal machines: they do much more than
what thay can explain. And that always get worse: the more a machine
is clever, the more che can discover things, and the lesser she can
explain.
For a real machine, the modal logic G grows; in the sense that his
predicate is able to prove more and more arithmetical proposition, and
thus G* grows too. But it can be shown that G* grows much more than G,
and so the non-explicative gap G* \ G get larger when the machine
develops itself reatively to its probable universal environment.
> it must be emulated the right infinity of times
I sometimes suspect that too. Either there are an infinite number
of stages above our own or matter must be something very special and
can do things that arithmetic could never do.
Which is the case. Good.
>> I see nothing above performing any calculations,
you're just writing first grade arithmetic problems in a different
notation, and your physical brain caused you to write the above
rather than 2+3= 2+1 or 4+0= 5.
> Proof?
Proofs don't make calculations,
Sigma_1 proof and calculations are the same thing. Like fortran
calculations are the same as algol calculations. They are recursively
equivalent. If interested I can explain the normal form theorem of
Kleene which shows the relation between a proof of a true sigma_1
sentence and a (terminating) computation.
physical microprocessor chips do. I want an EXAMPLE, I want a
example of a calculation made without the use of matter that obeys
the laws of Physics.
I gave one in the last post, but you confuse it with the sign used to
describe it. It is hard here to progress without doing an introduction
of the logic of name and mention. It is not that easy. I have already
explain the main thing, but stopped as it became too much technical. I
would be happy to proceed though.
> to prove this, you need to assume primary physical matter,
And to prove the nonexistence of primary physical
matter you must assume that we are living in a computer simulation
and there are an infinite (and not just an astronomically large)
number of nested simulations above our own.
But I don't have to assume this, as it is a theorem in arithmetic, or
in the model theory of arithmetic. Like I cannot prove that RA or PA
or ZF is consistent in RA (or in PA, or in ZF, respectively), to study
comp, we need more than RA. eventually, that is the reason why comp is
a theology, the machine have to accept more than she can justify. Comp
itself is like that.
>> If you use a more common notation and write 2+2 =4 those
ASCII characters are not performing a calculation either, they're
just reporting to me a calculation that your physical brain has
already made.
> No, we assimed the RA axioms, and then I can only give
you a representation of the computation
Axioms don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips
do.
Axioms does not, but sigma-& proof does, and when they stop we can
deduce that from the axioms, and arithmetic can do that too, by
Gödel's arithmetization of meta-arithmetic.
>> If calculations can really be done in RA then there is
absolutely positively no reason you can't start the RA Computer
Hardware Company and become a trillionaire.
> You are ridiculous. Computations can be done in RA.
The computations were made in 3 pounds of grey goo inside a box
made of bone sitting on your shoulders and then the result of those
computations were written on a physical paper in the notation of
RA. RA didn't calculate anything, zero zilch, nada, goose egg.
That is the usual confusion of level and meta-level. When I prove the
existence of a computation in the theory RA, I don't have to assume
grey good inside a box of bones ... I need that only to discuss with
you, and that is not part of the theory. On the contrary, I explain
the illusion of primary matter from the assumption of the law of
addition and multiplication only.
Then I could reverse the charge. Why do you believe in primary matter,
as there no evidences for it, at all. On the contrary, step 8 explains
why primary matter cannot have any relation with consciousness, so
even if it exists, it has no rôle at all. It cannot even explain the
observation of matter. Again, you need to get step 8 for this.
> usually I debate with person which claim that it can only be
done in RA, not in a physical universe, which can only approximate
the computations done in RA.
That would be a strange debate. Do you find a lot of people who
think 2 + 2 is only approximately 4?
Their argument is that a physical computer can only be an
approciamation of the mathematical one, like a physical circle can
only approximate a mathematica circle.
> Computation is defined in arithmetic.
Definitions don't make calculations, physical microprocessor
chips do.
When we say that computations are defined in arithmetic, we don't say
that the definition make the computations.
> >>This does not need any matter, like the existence of
a prime number bigger than 1000^(1000^(1000^1000)) does not require
matter.
>> But calculating that prime number most certainly DOES
require matter.
> But that prime number existence does not depend on its
computation,
I think maybe it does depend on the physical possibility of it
being computed in the universe, although I could be wrong.
That would make Euclid's wrong, and all mathematicians. Well, some
physicist, like Deutsch says something to that effect, but I find that
rather heavy, given that the goal is just to defend the primariness of
the physical universe. It is adding a gross ontological commitment to
prevent the possibility of a much simpler explanation. It is of the
type "evolution is nice but it fails to explain how god intervenes".
>> if the computational resources of the entire universe are
insufficient to produce that prime number even in theory then I'm
not entirely certain it would be meaningful to say it exists.
> Then you bet on ultrafinitism,
Maybe but not necessarily, perhaps the computational resources of
the entire universe is infinite, I just don't know.
We don't know if there is a physical *universe* (the aristotelian
always put "primary" in the definition of the universe).
>> I am unable to answer a gibberish question about the
future .
> it is not gibberish, and the guy can make a prediction, like it
will be either W or M.
"How many inches long is half a piece of string?" is a gibberish
question,
Sure, if you don't say how long is the string. But in the question
asked, everything has been made precise.
and "what one and only one city will you see after you becomes
two?" is another gibberish question.
Not at all, because computationalism make consistent that a person's
body is in two different cities, and that the person's feeling is that
it is in only once city (indeed in both place).
Actually they're not questions at all, they're just gibberish. You
need more than a question mark to write a question.
It is only gibberish when you abstract from the first and third person
perspective, like you just did here.
>> If both are John Clark, and Bruno Marchal said they were,
then obviously John Clark is NOT in only one place.
> Sure, but the question is not were John Clark will be, but
where he will feel to be,
Then I guess you agree with my statement above because you say
"sure" and if the personal pronoun "he" refers to John Clark then
how does replacing the proper noun "John Clark" with the personal
pronoun "he" alter the meaning of the sentence?
It does not. What changed the meaning was the 3p/1p distinction.
And if where John Clark is doesn't mean where John Clark feels to
be then what does it mean?
Where John Clark is = where his body is, and that can be in two cities.
Where each of those John Clark feels to be is obviously given by "only
one city".
Both said "one city", as they look around and see one city (Washington
or Moscow), even if intellectually each can bet that they have a
doppelganger in the other city, but as you said, they have become
different person even if both have the right to say that they are the
same guy as the one who was in Helsinki.
Bruno
John K Clark
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