On 04 Sep 2015, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> If arithmetic is more fundamental than physics as you say
then we should be able to write a program that would get the
computer wet, and yet we can't and your theory can not give an
adequate explanation of why not.
> you need to define what you mean by wet.
No I most certainly do not need to do that! Any definition of wet
that I give would be made of words and I have no doubt you would
then demand another definition of at least one of those words which
I could only provide with yet more words and round and round we go.
It would be much better if I gave an example not a definition, it
would be much better if I threw a bucket of water at you then
pointed at you and said "wet".
Oh, but then you refer to "wet---the 1p experiment", but that can be
emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be emulated (and are
actually emulated) in arithmetic.
But of course, we cannot make something physically wet (assuming
something like that exists) in our relative computations by programming.
>> Computationalism postulates that the computations a
PHYSICAL computer produce can create intelligent behavior and
consciousness, but computationalism does NOT postulate that
computations exist in arithmetic independent of physics.
> The fact that computations exist in arithmetic is a trivial
theorem.
You keep saying that, and yet in spite of the fact that it would
be trivial for you to do so you have been unable to explain why you
have not started The Marchal Computer Hardware Company and you have
been unable to explain why you are not a trillionare.
This is frankly ridiculous, as the point is that hardware is a
relative notion in arithmetic. You are again trying to confuse the
level. Arithmetic can emulate the wetness of water for an emulated
subject, and that is how hardware can exists in the relative way. To
simulate hardware per se is so much impossible that this is a part of
the reason why I do not believe such "primary" hardware exists, and so
you need to assume its existence to make your point, but then you are
begging the question.
>> Show me a example of arithmetic all by itself making a
calculation and you have won this argument, not a definition, not a
proof, an EXAMPLE. Stop talking about it and just show me!
> google a bit more on "Kleene predicate"
I don't want to google "Kleene predicate" and I don't want
another "proof" and I don't want a definition!!! I want an EXAMPLE,
I want to see you or anybody or anything else calculate 2 +2
without using matter!
Ah? Here is one, but please don't confuse what follows with the pixels
which represent it on the screen:
s(s(0)) + s(s(0))
s(s(s(0)) +s(0))
s(s(s(s(0) + 0)
s(s(s(s(0))))
here the computation is done in RA. Then, "the computation is done in
RA" is itself capable of being done in RA, but the sequence above will
have to be represented in RA, which will be something too long to fit
in this post, but being a (representation of a) computation is still
an arithmetical notion.
> Or read any textbook, or Gödel's original paper
I don't want to read any textbook, I don't want to read
Gödel's original paper! I want an EXAMPLE, I want to see
you calculate 2 +2 without using matter!
See above. This does not need any matter, like the existence of a
prime number bigger than 1000^(1000^(1000^1000)) does not require
matter.
>> Yes "you" will survive provided that "you" is defined as
somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki,
> But that is ambiguous, because if the guy (who remembers
being the man who was in Helsinki) is now in both city,
YES, and that is exactly precisely why asking what one and only
one city "you" will see in a world with "you" duplicating machines
in it is not a question at all, it is gibberish.
But that is exactly what is refuted by all copies. The copy having
01100001 in his diary is able to recognize "I was unable to predict
that".
> You continue to introduce an ambiguity by ignoring the 1p/3p
difference,
In the entire history of the world nobody, absolutely nobody, has
ignored the difference between 1p and 3p.
You just did above.
> we must still take into account the content of the 1p
experiences,
Who's 1p experience? Mr. You's. And who is Mr. You? The guy with
THE 1p experience. And round and round we go.
We have admitted that we need to look at all the content of all
diaries. They all describe one city, and as they can introspect, they
all remember having known this in advance, and thus predicted the "(1
and ~0) v (0 and ~1) for each pass, and they all confirmed that
prediction for their experience content. Again, this is the same as in
Everett. Your argument would refute as much MWI than the FPI.
> ignoring that when your body is in tow places, all your
possible subjective experiences' content mention only one place.
Who's subjective experiences are only in one place?
The subjective experience of each copy.
Mr. You's. And who is .....
All the guys who remember having been the Helsinki guy. They all feel
unique in a city that they could not have predicted, and that is
confirmed in all subsidiary multiplication.
Despite what you claim, you are repeating your confusion between the
1p and the 3p again, by avoiding doing the thought experiment in its
entirety.
As everyone have understood this, even you, this is a bit boring. I
will answer your next post if it contains something new. You might try
this question: is your way to predict what you will live remaining
unchanged, or not, when we introduced a delay of reconstitution in
the room with 0 (written on the paper in the drawer)?
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
