On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 , Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do.​
>
>
> ​> ​
> Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of turing
> universality by physical devices.
>

​What makes you so certain that Turing machines aren't just ​man made
descriptions (and approximate descriptions at that) of physical
computational devises? Usually the simpler thing simulates the more complex
thing, but a physical computer is far more complex than a Turing Machine,
so is a microprocessor implementing a Turing machine or is a
​
Turing Machine
​ implementing a microprocessor? ​

​> ​
> Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico-mathematical sense of
> existence?
>

​It doesn't matter, prime number don't make calculations, physical
microprocessors do. And all numbers may exist, but if the computational
resources of the entire physical universe is finite then the set that
contains all the prime numbers and only prime numbers may not. ​



> ​> ​
> a person can do a computation too, and they are not necessarily physical
>

​In the history of the world a no person lacking a physical brain has ever
made a calculation, and it is very easy to understand why if physics is
more fundamental than mathematics. But if mathematics is more fundamental
then that fact is quite odd.   ​
​

> ​> y​
> ou might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen, which
> explains this with some details.
>

​Books by ​
Torket Franzen
​ do not make calculations, physical microprocessors do.​


> ​> ​
> Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one computations,
> but on an infinity of them,
>

​Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical number of
calculations would be required to perfectly simulate water, but if you're
right and a infinite amount of mathematics would be required to do what
just a small amount of matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over
and physics is ​more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models
can never be more than just approximations of the real deal.

​>> ​
>> ​Definitions ​
>> ​don't ​make calculations, physical microprocessors do.
>>
>
> ​>​
> Definition does not but relation does.
>

​Only if the relations are about the orientation of PHYSICAL things. ​


> ​> ​
> Indeed a computation is a digital relation, and it does not depends on any
> physical assumption. Just read a book in theoretical computer science.
>

​No book in ​theoretical computer science can make a calculation, but a
physical microprocessor chip can.


>
>> ​>> ​
>> I don't assume anything but I do know 4 things for certain:
>> ​
>> 1) Simulated water can *not* quench my thirst.​
>>
>
>

​> ​
> That is ambiguous.
>

​If that is ambiguous then EVERYTHING is ambiguous, and without contrast
words have no meaning  ​


> ​> ​
>  you need to grasp step 3 before I can explain more on this.
>

​There is nothing in step 3 to grasp, there is no there there.​



> ​
>> ​> ​
>> Proofs don't make calculations,
>
>
> ​> ​
> Sigma_1 proof and calculations are the same thing.
>

​Then then I really *REALLY *don't understand why you don't start the ​Sigma_1
Proof Computer Hardware Corporation and become the richest man who ever
lived.


> ​> ​
> Like fortran calculations are the same as algol calculations.
>

​Yes, without physical hardware to run them on both FORTRAN and Algol are
indeed the same, both are just squiggles on paper. ​


​> ​
> comp is a theology,
>

​Maybe​, but I no longer care what "comp" is.


​> ​
> When I prove the existence of a computation in the theory RA
> ​ [...]
>

​I don't need the ​the theory RA
​ to prove to me that computations exist, I already know that they do, what
I want is for the
theory RA
​, or anything else,
to make a computation without the use of matter that obeys the laws of
physics. And I don't want a proof, and I don't want a axiom, and I don't
want a definition, and I don't want a book; *I want a computation.  *


> ​> ​
> you need to get step 8 for this.
>

​Until you fix step 3 any higher step is meaningless.

​> ​
> Their argument is that a physical computer can only be an approciamation
> of the mathematical one, like a physical circle can only approximate a
> mathematica circle.
>

​A physical circle, like one drawn by hand with ink on paper, if far far
more complex than a mathematical circle; so you tell me, which is a
approximation of which?   ​

> ​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​that prime number existence does not depend on its computation,
>>
>>
> ​>> ​
>> ​I think maybe it does depend on the physical possibility of it
>> being computed in the universe, although I could be wrong.​
>
> ​> ​
> That would make Euclid's wrong,
>

​If so he wouldn't be the first ancient Greek that was dead wrong.​


​> ​
> Where John Clark is = where his body is,
>

​So you think consciousness has a position, does consciousness have a
velocity too, or a temperature, or a pressure, or a mass, or a magnetic
moment? ​


​  John K Clark​

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