On Tue, Sep 29, 2015  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> ​>
>> ​>> ​
>> ​
>> Now you equate existence with constructive existence,
>>
>
> ​>> ​
> ​What the hell?  You're the one that is equating those two things not me!
> I don't want you to answer the question "does the 423rd prime number
> greater than 10^100^100 exist?", I want you to tell me the answer to
> ​a
> completely different question, "what is the 423rd prime number greater
> than 10^100^100?".
>
> ​> ​
> So you are asking me a constructive existence of such a number,
>

​The question I am asking is precise, easy to understand, and impossible
for you to answer;  what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?
​
 I know why I can't answer that question but you have no explanation why
you can't answer that question.



> ​> ​
> and even a consturctive in a not well defined physical sense.
>

​Oh for Christ's sake! I don't give a damn if it's in the Bozo the Clown
sense, just tell me what the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is
or tell me why you can't figure it out. I can't figure it out because there
are not enough atoms in my brain that can be put into unique states that
can individually correspond with 10^100^100 numbers; but your mind doesn't
need matter that obeys the laws of physics to operate so I want to know why
you can't figure it out.


> ​> ​
> But Computationalism, is
> ​ [blah blah blah blah]
>

​Quit staling c
ut the
​bafflegab
and just tell me
​ ​
what the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is or tell me why you
can't figure it out. You say computation doesn't need physics just numbers,
well you have access to numbers, so why can't you tell me what the
​ ​
the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is
​ ​
?
​ What are you lacking?​


​> ​
> The question was: does computation (in the original standard sense of
> Turing's or Church's definition of computability, using the intensional
> Church thesis (which says that not only all universal machines compute the
> same class of functions, but all universal machines can emulate all
> universal machine, that is, all universal machine can imitate exactly all
> digital processes starting from finite conditions (relatively or not to
> some oracle).
>

​*NO*, that wasn't the question at all! In fact the above doesn't even look
like a question​. The question was "what the
​ ​
the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 ?".

​> ​
> So the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations, exist in
> the usual 3p sense of asserting, for example, that the prime numbers,
> including those greater 100^(100^100).
>

​Well good for "​
the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations
​", I'm very happy for them. And now let's get back to the topic at hand,
what
​is ​
the
​ ​
the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 ?


> I use computation is the mathematical sense of Alonzo Church, Emil Post,
> Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing, Matiyazevic, etc.
>

​That's nice good for you, then use use computation is the mathematical
sense of Alonzo Church, Emil Post, Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing and
Matiyazevic and tell me what what the 423rd prime number greater than
10^100^100 is.

> ​>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation"
>>
>>
> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> It means computation using physics.
>
> ​> ​
> Computation in which sense?
>

​Sense in which sense? And I can't answer your question until you define
"in". And then define "which".

And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to definitions,
it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop that people always use
when they're losing a debate.


​> ​
> The problem is that you give the impression that you believe that
> computation does not exist in, or be emulated by, arithmetic.
>

​I'm sorry if I only gave a vague impression of that so let me say as
flatly and directly as I can that as of today there is ZERO evidence that
arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics; that
situation could change tomorrow but that's how things are right now. ​


> ​> ​
> I exploit the fact that sigma_1 complete provability is equivalent with
> universal computability.


​Mathematical objects may or may not exist independently of physics, but
mathematics proofs certainly do not; proofs are just a way humans have of
discovering (or maybe inventing) those mathematical objects.  ​


​> ​
> Saying that there is a physical universe doing that is no better than
> saying God made it.
>

Saying that there is a
​mathematical universe ​is no better than saying there is a
physical universe
​. And the physical universe at the time of the Big Bang was far simpler
that the universe is today, and was infinitely simpler than a omnipotent
omniscient
God. Bruno you're a logician so you tell me, if two logical systems produce
the exact same conclusions but one starts out with fewer and simpler axioms
than the other which one is superior?  I think
William of Ockham
​ made a pretty good razor, there is no point in adding wheels withing
wheels if they're not needed. ​

  John K Clarl



>
>
>

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