On 10/15/2015 6:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



    On 10/15/2015 2:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


    On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Bruce Kellett
    <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

        On 15/10/2015 12:07 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
        On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 1:17 AM, Bruce Kellett
        <[email protected]
        <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

            On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
            Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence
            toward multiple realizability, and therefore, against
            mind-brain identity theory. They show that it is
            functional equivalence, rather than
            material/compositional equivalence that matters. Since
            computers can realize any finite function, then
            assuming there are no necessary infinities within the
            brain, computers can realize any functional state the
            brain is able to realize. For physicalism to be
            correct, you have to believe either that functional
            states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics
            can instantiate functional states which Turing machines
            cannot.

            That is simply false.


        Well that explains it.


                Again it's not clear what you mean by
                computationalism. Bruce can speak for himself, but
                I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.


            Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate
            independent. But I thought Bruce argued against
            consciousness being derivable from mathematical
            computations, which would mean consciousness is
            substrate dependent: that it depends on physically
            implemented Turing machines.

            I certainly argued that consciousness could not be
            sustained on platonic computations in arithmetic. But
            that was because I do not accept that such things exist.


        What evidence have you seen that led you to this conclusion?

        What evidence do you need to say that something does not
        exist? Absence of evidence is, in this case, evidence of absence.


    Why is that so in this case, when the standard form of that
    phrase is "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence"?

    Also, despite your claims to there being no evidence, there is in
    fact evidence of platonic computations. They exist independently
    of you, mean, and this physical universe, as surely as "7 is
    prime" is true independently of you, me and the physical universe.


            In mathematics you have descriptions of Turing machines
            and descriptions of computations, but no live machines
            or computations.


        There are both.

        What evidence do you have for this assertion?


    The existence of a UD implies a quantum reality, and we observe a
    quantum reality.
    Accepting the truth of arithmetical systems like the axioms of
    Peano/Robinson arithmetic, implies their existence.

    Does accepting the truth of "Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick."
    implies that they both existed?



If you believe in axioms wherein you can derive a valid proof that "Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick" and that they exist.

"Believe in" would be a strange thing to do with axioms. But it's trivial to devise axioms that entail "Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick.":

1) Watson was Sherlock Holmes sidekick.



            Substrate independence simply means that you can replace
            all or part of the human brain with computer-based
            equivalents. In other words, strong AI. No need for
            platonia in order to say that consciousness is
            independent of the substrate.


        But if it is independent of substrate, and if computations
        exist platonically, then those platonic computations are
        equally capable of instantiating consciousness.

        You are confusing the meaning of 'substrate'. In the context,
        I meant an explicitly physical substrate. Platonia is an idea,


    If Platonia is an idea, then so is "The primary physical
    reality". It is up to science now, to determine which of these
    two ideas is more likely to be true.

        it is no more 'physically real' than is the idea of a
        unicorn, or of Hogwarts School.


    Of course it isn't physically real. But why assume physical
    existence is the only kind of existence? That seems to be an idea
    based purely faith.

    We commonly assume other kinds of existence; they're called
    "fictional".


To say something exists "only in fiction" means it exists only as a false account from someone's imagination with no ties to reality.

In free logics propositions may be true even though their terms do not denote.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-free/

Brent

Jason

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