On 28 Oct 2015, at 10:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 28 Oct 2015, at 9:28 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:



On 10/27/2015 3:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 28 Oct 2015, at 1:30 AM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:



On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 5:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > wrote:

​ >> ​ ​From examples in the physical world. You can give as many botanical definitions of the word "tree" as you want but it will just be a word defined by other words that are themselves defined by yet more words that are.... If you tried to dig for meaning all you'd find is a endless loop, it would just be a game where words are manipulated according to the rules of botany until somebody forgot about definitions and pointed to the ​ ASCII string "t-r-e-e" and then pointed to a large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose that exists in the physical world. Then even a martian would notice a correspondence between this game of manipulating symbols called "botany" that humans had invented and the way these large photosynthesizing organism made largely of cellulose live.

​ > ​ What about a virtual world with trees and observers, and no I/O devices connecting it to outside trees?

There would ​ still be I/O devices connected to the ​virtual trees made by a computer that operated according to the laws of physics, if not the trees wouldn't even be virtual. And the books on both virtual botany and real botany would still be more than a just a symbol manipulation game, they would have semantic content ​ because there would be a ​ correspondence between ​ the way the symbols ​ are manipulated and the way the virtual (or real) large photosynthesizing organism live. ​ Regardless of if they are virtual or real ​if you want to know how trees live studying those botany symbols in virtual (or real) books will help, so they must have semantic content ​ .

The requirement that a computation be able to interact with the real world puts a restriction on what qualifies as a computation. You've challenged Bruno many times to perform a difficult computation using his Platonic computer. Well, that computation is occurring in front of you now in the thermal motion of the atoms in your desk, which under an appropriate interpretation are implementing a Turing machine. But you and Bruno don't have that appropriate interpretation, and if you did, you would have the result of the calculation already. In other words, the thermal motion computation is not understandable as such in, and cannot interact with, the world at the level of the substrate of its implementation; so it would usually be said that either there is no computation being implemented, or it is being implemented only in a trivial and useless sense. But remove the requirement for interaction in the real world, and this objection falls down. The computation is being implemented, your difficult calculation has been completed, and it is being appreciated by the virtual observers who are clapping and cheering - even though you can't hear them.

That's essentially Bruno's MGA, except it stops one step short. Bruno takes the last step and says even if the atoms of your desk were doing absolutely nothing there is an interpretation in which that is a computation; hence the atoms are superfluous. But clearly then it is the interpretation which is providing the computation.

I agree; if anything at all can be seen as a computation,


But anything at all cannot be seen as a computation. A computation ïs* the doing of some universal numbers. For all bases, most things will not be computation. They are very specific object/relation in arithmetic. They are determined by a universal number, and the data, having decided on some base to describe them.



it is not the thing that matters, but the interpretation.

Usually done by some universal number (in arithmetic, for example).




There are two ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to say that consciousness is not computable. The other is to say that a computation can only be implemented relative to the real world.

The first negate computationalism, and the second use a god-of-the-gap (real world) to use a never defined notion (physical implementation of a computation) and this to hide a problem instead of trying to solve it.

Bruno




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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