On 31 Oct 2015, at 02:42, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/30/2015 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-30 19:20 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>:
On 10/30/2015 9:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>:
2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark <[email protected]>:
On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]
> wrote:
>> And I repeat, If the microprocessor made of matter
that obeys the laws of physics can't sense **any** information in
the AI program then the AI program is not running, it's not
intelligent it's just a inert list of instructions DOING nothing.
> Re-read what is written above...
OK :
" And I repeat, If the microprocessor made of matter that
obeys the laws of physics can't sense **any** information in the
AI program then the AI program is not running, it's not
intelligent it's just a inert list of instructions DOING
nothing. "
> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external
world ?*
>> It could have memories of that external world before
the sensors were detached, if they were never attached then it
could have no knowledge of that world
> That's the point... as no information of that "external"
world is fed to it.
Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external
world and the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as
are the results of calculations made
by the physical
microprocessors that are also in that external physical world.
That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are
confusing level as usual.
I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest
here... with a simple real life example.
So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment
System game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be
run in an emulator running on a physical computer... or on an
emulator running on an emulator running on a physical computer...
From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases
because all informations it has from the substrate(machine running
it) is the same, the NES game cannot know it is not really running
on a physical NES...
Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it
cannot tell the ontological status of what that information
represent... those informations could come from a really real
ontological physical world... or an emulation of the really real
ontological physical world or an emulation of an emulation of the
really real ontological physical world.... it has no way to decide
the ontological status of that "external world".
I think you are confusing a virtual world with an AI.
No I'm not.
An AI must be embedded in a world, a context, which it interacts
with.
where this "must" come from ? an AI has to have a context sure... a
world "as in our everyday world"... why would it ?
It can only be intelligent in the sense of interacting intelligently.
Either it is conscious or it is not... if it is conscious, it knows
it, it doesn't care if you see it behaving "intelligently" or not.
A virtual world can't be intelligent.
What are you talking about ? I'm talking about the ability for an
AI to give an ontological status about the information it has on
something external to it... it has simply no way of doing it, as my
example with the game program illustrate it, the program cannot
know if it is run directly on the "metal" or on an emulation of
it... which means from it's POV, the direct "metal" or a virtual
"metal" has the same "realness"... which makes the "metal" from
it's POV an hypothetical (it can or not be ontological, the AI as
simply no way to tell).
OK. I thought you were saying the video game was intelligent. I
agree that the AI within a virtual reality must form theories about
what it interacts with and can't know that it's reality is
virtual. But I doubt that there is anything that can be inferred
from "we might be in the Matrix". It's just another way of saying
we can't know Kant's ding an sich.
Not really, because if we are in the matrix, then we are in infinities
of matrices, and we get information from the theories.
The math of the universal numbers does not depend on the choice of the
universal number used to talk about the difference and interactions in
between the universal numbers, and possible oracles.
Then, by studying this coming from machine's psychology and theology,
we can distinguish nuances like qualia and quanta, or divine (true)
and terrestrial (emulable by some universal machine).
Assuming a primary physical universe makes things more difficult, both
for matter and mind, not to talk on the relationship.
Bruno
Brent
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