On 14 Jun 2016, at 16:19, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 13/06/2016 7:12 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 6/12/2016 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that
mathematics
is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by
evolution, just
like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other
functions.
Bruno doesn't like that story though because it means mathematics
only
exists as instantiated in brains.
It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper,
and many
contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this
assumption put
the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying God made it.
They
don't push enough their own Darwinian logic.
That's begging the question. You assume arithmetic; which sweeps the
mind-body problem under the rug by making the "body" part hard.
Everybody
starts by assuming something. Assuming physics and providing an
evolution
based account of the development of mind and minds development of
arithmetic
is just as legitimate as starting with arithmetic and trying to
derive
matter and mind.
Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less
account for
matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one
specifies precisely what form of computation.
It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much
different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this
hypothesis.
I would express this differently. Only persons are conscious (and no
problem seeing a person already in a spider). But persons are the
result of comples dynamical state relative to the state of some others
universal machines (from the physical laws to your parents, the boss,
etc.).
The first person is not associated to one computation, but to an
infinity of them, emerging from a non trivial structure (eventually
the sigma_1 sentences (with or without oracle) structured by the
modalities of self-reference (which exists and are variate due to
incompleteness).
Computation is still a third person describable object (assuming
Church-Turing). But consciousness is a first person thing, and no
machine can equate it with any thing third person describable.
I think you know this and made a periphrase, this is for the possible
benefits of others.
And why that form of
computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism
actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are
every bit
as difficult as the problems one started with.
But computationalism is the default position of modern science.
I agree. Computationalism is almost accepting that brains does not
work by magic (infinities, substancial angel).
The
brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a
Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is
somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality,
appeal to a soul and so on.
It appeal to some non computable things, without ever making it precise.
And after Gödel+Turing (say), we know that machines are already
confronted to the non computable, even just by looking at themselves.
I think that is why Diderot define rationalism by Descartes'
mechanism. Non-mechanism is like substituting ignorance for knowledge
and forgetting to add the interrogation mark. But, the more we study
computationalism, the more also we will understand the shape of
possible non computationalist theories, end eventually we can expect
to see what match better the facts.
I don't find that computationalism was created to "solve anything". It
is just the most obvious interpretation of a variety of empirical
observations across fields: neuroscience, biology, chemistry, computer
science.
Yes, and it is a lantern where we can search the keys. In particular
computationalism, that is Digital (Descarte's) Mechanism, thank to
Church Thesis, makes the field purely mathematical.
At least with scientific
realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's
experience:
i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how.
Again, computationalism is the position of scientific realism. But
Bruno's work (unless you mange to refute it) shows that
computationalism is not compatible with the sort of objective external
world that you like. So you have to choose one or the other.
I do agree with you that, as far as I can tell, consciousness remains
a mystery in Bruno's model.
In deeply disagree on this, and this means you have to work a bit more.
Let me explain shortly. First we start from consciousness, by
(re)defining computationalism as the assumption that there is a level
of description of myself such that my consciousness remains unchanged
through a functional substitution made at that level.
Then that consciousness appears to be a differentiating flux of
possibilities starting from any relative universal state (relative to
either some other universal number, or from the universal base (here
RA).
In UDA, to get the "reversal" physics/arithmetic, you need not more
than AI and Everett notion: the personal memory (the personal diary).
But when we translate this in arithmetic, the first person is defined
by the Theaetetus's idea of linking the self-representation with the
truth. We can do that easily mathematically, because we restrict
ourself to the sound machine by construction. But no machine can know
they are sound, nor even really define what that means for them. The
result is that the first person knowledge ([]p & p) is not definable,
nor is the first person sensation ([]p & <>t & p, p sigma_1). This
explains why the soul is so elusive a notion, and consciousness so
obvious (close to <>t v t) from the machine first person view, yet
entirely not describable in arithmetical term. But machine can try
approximation, and as long as they don't pretend to get it, they can
progress.
All the things work because the mind of the self-referentially correct
is between the 3-self, the 1-self, and God, that is: G, S4Grz, and G*.
They all want []p -> p (reflexion), p/[]p (necessitation) and Löb []
([]p -> p)-> []p (modesty).
Exercise: shows that this leads to contradiction. So they share the
work:
The 3-self (G) keeps Löb and the necessitation, and thus abandon
reflexion.
God (G*) keeps reflexion and Löb, and thus abandon necessitation.
The soul (the 1-self, the knower) keeps reflexion and necessitation,
and thus abandon Löb. It lost modesty, and if its mother does not
educate it well, it might become a tyrant.
I will give the solution later after the (oral) June Exams which start
tomorrow. Revise the Chellas :)
I can see how the UDA is uncomfortable to some people, but like with
all science we can't choose, just check for correctness.
That is the best we can hope.
In all fields.
Freedom of religion (laicity) is not freedom of teaching the kids
invalid inference rules.
I really urge people to read the following book:
Daniel J. Cohen, 2007, Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and
Victorian Faith, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
It explains convingly how modern mathematical logic started from
theological motivation, with Peirce (Benjamin, the father of Charles
Sanders Peirce), Boole, De Morgan, Carroll (!), etc. The goal was
notably to introduce more rigors, and concerned mainly Unitarians
wanting to take distance from the more Dogmatic conventional
Trinitarians. Ironically, the theology of the universal machine is
more trinitarian than unitarian, well it is 4 + 4 * infinity-arian,
somehow.
That book explains how the goal of making mathematics accepted as
profession made the mathematicians starting to hide and eventually
deny the theological motivation. No doubt that was good for making
mathematics into a profession, but why not starting professionalizing
theology, or at least its professionalizable part?
Making a science "illegal", and you give the "market" to the
"charlatan", like making a medication illegal gives the markets to the
criminals.
And now a tip to get closer to God: avoid all tips to get closer to
God. (grin)
I have to go. I will be busy for a few days.
Best
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
