On 12 Jun 2016, at 00:14, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 6/11/2016 3:04 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jun 11, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]
> wrote:
​> ​ You seem to equate physics with primary matter, and yet I
know of no
law of physics that implies primary matter.
​As I've said 6.02*10^23 times it's irrelevant if matter is
primary or not, matter is still necessary to make calculations or
perform intelligent behavior or produce consciousness.
I think Bruno agrees with that - although maybe he still holds that
a conscious being could just be conscious of mathematical axioms and
proofs and theorems. Anyway I've argued with him that even if his
theory of mathematics/computation first is true and conscious
thought and physics are derivative, the derived physics will still
be necessary. That a consciousness with no world to be conscious OF
is incoherent.
We need matter to get physical brain and physical computer, and the
same for human and man-made machine consciousness.
But that matter is shown to be only a statistical appearance from the
point of view of all machines incarnated by *any* universal system
semantic.
Your use of "world" is ambiguous. We need some reality for having
consciousness, but any universal systems will do. I use arithmetic
because it is taught in high school. Now, number theory suggest that
it might be the last winner too, as number theory smell a lot quantum
all by itself. But to get both physics (quanta and qualia), better to
not be influenced by the choice of the assume universal system.
Physics, and theology, is machine independent, or formal system
independent, or theory independent, (would say a computer scientist).
And even if matter isn't primary that doesn't necessarily mean
mathematics is.
The question is can one be derived from the other?
UDA shows that if mechanism is correct, there is no choice in the
matter: physics must be derived from a sum on all computations.
And AUDA (the interview) shows how, and get already the propositional
logic of the observable (and it is a reasonable quantum logic already,
but of course that could be a coincidence ...)
William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that
mathematics is a way of brains thinking about things that was found
by evolution, just like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a
lot of other functions. Bruno doesn't like that story though
because it means mathematics only exists as instantiated in brains.
It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper,
and many contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this
assumption put the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying
God made it. They don't push enough their own Darwinian logic.
He thinks matter and physics, as well as consciousness, can be
derived from computation.
Not really, I explain it MUST be derived from computation. If not, you
get comp + ad hoc magic.
He argues that consciousness is as fundamental as matter and that
computation is the right stuff to make both of them,
In the UDA way. The apparent primary matter is not emulable by any
computer, normally, as any observable is a first person entity relying
on the entire arithmetical truth, which is beyond any axiomatic.
whereas he thinks he has a proof that consciousness can't be made
from matter (his "movie graph" argument).
OK, but the seven steps should be largely enough. The movie-graph is
only there to prevent a certain type of cutting hair objection, and it
has some interest per se in philosophy of mind. Maudlin's version can
help to develop the intuition that the physical activity associated
with any computation can be made arbitrarily close to the physical
activity of any other computations. And that is true, even in
arithmetic, making consciousness an abstract thing related to truth,
and not to computations per se. In fact it is in the relation between
computation, and proof with *truth*, that consciousness and
meaningfulness relies.
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
