On 6/14/2016 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let me explain shortly. First we start from consciousness, by (re)defining computationalism as the assumption that there is a level of description of myself such that my consciousness remains unchanged through a functional substitution made at that level.
But already at the beginning you have swept the problem under the rug. Notice that you could replace "consciousness" by "physics" in the same sentence. You're just assuming that whatever you're talking about can be computed - which is OK, but it's not solution to the problem of consciousness until you can say exactly which computations are conscious an which are not. I think it is interesting that you consider spiders conscious, but not plants. What's the difference? Obviously it's the degree and scope of interaction with the environment. Which to me is further evidence that you implicitly recognize there can be no sharp division between matter and mind.
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