On Tue, Jun 14, 2016 at 7:09 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 14 Jun 2016, at 16:19, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 3:22 AM, Bruce Kellett >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> On 13/06/2016 7:12 am, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> On 6/12/2016 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> William S. Cooper, "The Origin of Reason" makes an argument that >>> mathematics >>> is a way of brains thinking about things that was found by evolution, >>> just >>> like mobility, metabolism, reproduction,...and a lot of other functions. >>> Bruno doesn't like that story though because it means mathematics only >>> exists as instantiated in brains. >>> >>> >>> It is not a question of liking this or not. It is just that Cooper, and >>> many >>> contemporaries, assumed some physical universe, and that this assumption >>> put >>> the mind-body problem under the rug. It is like saying God made it. They >>> don't push enough their own Darwinian logic. >>> >>> >>> That's begging the question. You assume arithmetic; which sweeps the >>> mind-body problem under the rug by making the "body" part hard. Everybody >>> starts by assuming something. Assuming physics and providing an >>> evolution >>> based account of the development of mind and minds development of >>> arithmetic >>> is just as legitimate as starting with arithmetic and trying to derive >>> matter and mind. >>> >>> >>> Assuming arithmetic does not even account for mind, much less account for >>> matter. Saying that consciousness is a computation is empty until one >>> specifies precisely what form of computation. >> >> >> It might be that all computations are conscious -- but with much >> different contents, of course. I feel some inclination towards this >> hypothesis. > > > I would express this differently. Only persons are conscious (and no problem > seeing a person already in a spider). But persons are the result of comples > dynamical state relative to the state of some others universal machines > (from the physical laws to your parents, the boss, etc.). > > The first person is not associated to one computation, but to an infinity of > them, emerging from a non trivial structure (eventually the sigma_1 > sentences (with or without oracle) structured by the modalities of > self-reference (which exists and are variate due to incompleteness). > > Computation is still a third person describable object (assuming > Church-Turing). But consciousness is a first person thing, and no machine > can equate it with any thing third person describable. > > I think you know this and made a periphrase, this is for the possible > benefits of others.
Yes. The point of my crude simplification was to argue that, in the extreme, computationalism creates no more of a mystery about consciousness than physicalism. My point to Bruce is that insists on wanting things that are not compatible with each other -- from my amateurish understanding of theoretical physics, this happens in other areas of science: you can choose weirdness A or weirdness B, but you cannot get rid of all weirdness. In my view you cannot want "scientific realism" and also ignore that the brain really looks like a computer. But then you cannot ignore the consequences of the UDA. All this independently of what consciousness is, I would say. But maybe you also disagree. > > > >> >>> And why that form of >>> computation rather than some other? I don't see that computationalism >>> actually solves anything -- the problems it leaves unanswered are every >>> bit >>> as difficult as the problems one started with. >> >> >> But computationalism is the default position of modern science. > > > I agree. Computationalism is almost accepting that brains does not work by > magic (infinities, substancial angel). > > > >> The >> brain is a neural network, the neural network is equivalent to a >> Turing Machine and it is running a program, and this is what mind is >> somehow. Non-computationalism seems to require some form of duality, >> appeal to a soul and so on. > > > It appeal to some non computable things, without ever making it precise. > > And after Gödel+Turing (say), we know that machines are already confronted > to the non computable, even just by looking at themselves. > > I think that is why Diderot define rationalism by Descartes' mechanism. > Non-mechanism is like substituting ignorance for knowledge and forgetting to > add the interrogation mark. But, the more we study computationalism, the > more also we will understand the shape of possible non computationalist > theories, end eventually we can expect to see what match better the facts. > > > >> >> I don't find that computationalism was created to "solve anything". It >> is just the most obvious interpretation of a variety of empirical >> observations across fields: neuroscience, biology, chemistry, computer >> science. > > > Yes, and it is a lantern where we can search the keys. In particular > computationalism, that is Digital (Descarte's) Mechanism, thank to Church > Thesis, makes the field purely mathematical. > > > >> >>> At least with scientific >>> realism, one has the objective external world to underpin one's >>> experience: >>> i.e., one knows that it works, even if one is not quite sure how. >> >> >> Again, computationalism is the position of scientific realism. But >> Bruno's work (unless you mange to refute it) shows that >> computationalism is not compatible with the sort of objective external >> world that you like. So you have to choose one or the other. >> >> I do agree with you that, as far as I can tell, consciousness remains >> a mystery in Bruno's model. > > > In deeply disagree on this, and this means you have to work a bit more. > > Let me explain shortly. First we start from consciousness, by (re)defining > computationalism as the assumption that there is a level of description of > myself such that my consciousness remains unchanged through a functional > substitution made at that level. > > Then that consciousness appears to be a differentiating flux of > possibilities starting from any relative universal state (relative to either > some other universal number, or from the universal base (here RA). > > In UDA, to get the "reversal" physics/arithmetic, you need not more than AI > and Everett notion: the personal memory (the personal diary). > > But when we translate this in arithmetic, the first person is defined by > the Theaetetus's idea of linking the self-representation with the truth. We > can do that easily mathematically, because we restrict ourself to the sound > machine by construction. But no machine can know they are sound, nor even > really define what that means for them. The result is that the first person > knowledge ([]p & p) is not definable, nor is the first person sensation ([]p > & <>t & p, p sigma_1). This explains why the soul is so elusive a notion, > and consciousness so obvious (close to <>t v t) from the machine first > person view, yet entirely not describable in arithmetical term. But machine > can try approximation, and as long as they don't pretend to get it, they can > progress. I do have to work more to fully understand some of your more "advanced" :) ideas, but even from what you say above, this is my impression: you have a great theory for why we cannot explain consciousness, but you still do not explain it. > > All the things work because the mind of the self-referentially correct is > between the 3-self, the 1-self, and God, that is: G, S4Grz, and G*. > > They all want []p -> p (reflexion), p/[]p (necessitation) and Löb []([]p -> > p)-> []p (modesty). > > Exercise: shows that this leads to contradiction. So they share the work: > > The 3-self (G) keeps Löb and the necessitation, and thus abandon reflexion. > God (G*) keeps reflexion and Löb, and thus abandon necessitation. > The soul (the 1-self, the knower) keeps reflexion and necessitation, and > thus abandon Löb. It lost modesty, and if its mother does not educate it > well, it might become a tyrant. > > I will give the solution later after the (oral) June Exams which start > tomorrow. Revise the Chellas :) Ok :) > > > > > >> >> I can see how the UDA is uncomfortable to some people, but like with >> all science we can't choose, just check for correctness. > > > That is the best we can hope. > > In all fields. > > Freedom of religion (laicity) is not freedom of teaching the kids invalid > inference rules. > > I really urge people to read the following book: > > Daniel J. Cohen, 2007, Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian > Faith, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. > > It explains convingly how modern mathematical logic started from theological > motivation, with Peirce (Benjamin, the father of Charles Sanders Peirce), > Boole, De Morgan, Carroll (!), etc. The goal was notably to introduce more > rigors, and concerned mainly Unitarians wanting to take distance from the > more Dogmatic conventional Trinitarians. Ironically, the theology of the > universal machine is more trinitarian than unitarian, well it is 4 + 4 * > infinity-arian, somehow. > > That book explains how the goal of making mathematics accepted as profession > made the mathematicians starting to hide and eventually deny the theological > motivation. No doubt that was good for making mathematics into a profession, > but why not starting professionalizing theology, or at least its > professionalizable part? > > Making a science "illegal", and you give the "market" to the "charlatan", > like making a medication illegal gives the markets to the criminals. > > And now a tip to get closer to God: avoid all tips to get closer to God. > (grin) > > I have to go. I will be busy for a few days. > > Best > > Bruno > >> >> Telmo. >> >>> >>> Bruce >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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